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  • Able Danger Blog: Tenet book includes July 2001 slide show
    Tenet has been doing a slow burn ever since he left the CIA He s been angrier and angrier as he saw himself being essentially made the fall guy on WMD in Iraq And he s gonna come back saying he and his agency the CIA were pushed again and again by Cheney and Cheney s people to give him the answers that they wanted And he s got chapter and verse on that He added He will tell a story that I think will make people s hair curl But he s been waiting a long time to tell this And he ll also say this is a very important part of this that on the question of what would happen in Iraq after the invasion the CIA pretty consistently warned You have trouble ahead You will not be able to unite this country Sunnis and Shiites are gonna be at daggers Apparently NBC s Andrea Mitchell knows something too because she kicked He ll also attack and criticize Condoleezza Rice who has denied a critical briefing before 9 11 a July briefing They actually have the slide show that they showed her where they were telling her that al Qaeda was threatening You re gonna be re fighting both sides of who lost Iraq who lost the WMD struggle It might get pretty brutal Tenet s book is already 132 at amazon com in sales rankings posted by Supporter 11 23 AM View our Able Danger timeline Read Tony Shaffer s testimony Listen to audio of the hearing Browse the hearing transcript Demand more news coverage Support a new investigation Add a banner to your site Disclaimer WWW Able Danger Blog About Us Vi is QT Monster Mike is TopDog08 Voxott is Voice of the Taciturn Email Us

    Original URL path: http://www.abledangerblog.com/2007/04/tenet-book-includes-july-2001-slide.html (2016-02-13)
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  • Able Danger Blog: Translated article from Le Monde
    the other side of the Atlantic two former CIA specialists on the al Qaeda who we contacted do not remember any special alerts sent by the DGSE Neither Gary Berntsen attached to the office of the DDO from 1982 to 2005 nor Michael Scheuer former head of the bin Laden unit at the CIA have any recollection of specific information coming from the DGSE In Washington the 9 11 Commission in its final report published in July 2004 underscored the inability of the FBI the CIA and the immigration services to piece together the sparse data pointing towards some of the 9 11 hijackers At no point did the commission bring up the possibility that the CIA would have sent up to political powers as early as January 2001 intelligence coming from French intelligence regarding the tactical choice of bin Laden to hijack American airliners And beyond that the most astounding thing about the 328 page DGSE report lies in the juxtaposition of the reports warning of the threat like that of January 2001 and those that give quite early on highly detailed information on the function of the organization Beginning on July 24 2000 with a 13 page report entitled The Networks of Osama bin Laden it s all there in black and white The context the anecdotal details and all the strategic aspects relative to al Qaeda are already there Quite often later documents simply add additional details For example the rumor that bin Laden was dead which went around in September 2006 is reported with the intonations of an oft heard refrain but nonetheless not without foundation The ex Saudi who has lived for several years in grim circumstances is constantly on the move from camp to camp suffering equally from kidney and back problems Recurring rumors speak of his imminent demise but he does not seem to have changed his daily habits up to now On an aerial photo from August 28 2000 DGSE agents spot a key figure Abu Khabab Abu Khabab al Masri al Qaeda s chief bomb maker and chemical weapons expert close to bin Laden He is an Egyptian bomb maker known for having taught how to make home made bombs to generations of jihadists and he is a high ranked target In two biographical items on him dated October 25 2000 and January 9 2001 the DGSE specifies information exchanged with Mossad the CIA and Egyptian security services regarding him His activities and movements are well covered Likewise for Omar Chabani a k a Abu Jafar said to be killed in Tora Bora in late 2001 the emir who is in charge of training all the militant Algerians who have come to Afghanistan according to the DGSE Al Qaeda thanks to him have set up during 2001 some infrastructures made available to the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat GSPC the terrorist Algerian movement whose head Hassan Hattab ex ally of bin Laden which endorsed in 2006 a policy of reconciliation with the Algerian president Bouteflika provoking the ire of the younger generation in the GSPC These younger people kept up the combat which their elders had dropped the younger created a new GSPC renamed al Qaeda for an Islamic Maghreb which seems to have been responsible for the attacks of April 11th in Algiers Alongside operational aspects of the functioning of al Qaeda these DGSE documents propose another look at the political go betweens used by its chief An example in a note of February 15 2001 devoted in part to the risk of attacks against the French military base in Djibouti the authors note the presence in the country of bin Laden s representative for the Horn of Africa Nidal Abdel hay al Mahainy They note that he arrived on May 26 2000 and met with the president of the Djibouti Republic But it is Saudi Arabia that is constantly the most worrisome with regard to sympathies for Afghanistan which bin Laden is profiting from The DGSE reports explore bin Laden s relations with business men and various organizations in that country Certain Saudi personalities have proclaimed their hostility to al Qaeda but evidently they have not convinced everyone Pierre Antoine Lorenzi remembers well what the high placed people at the DGSE were thinking The DGSE had a lot of difficulty believing that he didn t have any relations with the Saudi monarchy just because he was banished It was hard to accept The report from July 24 2000 mentions a payment of 4 5 million dollars going to bin Laden from the International Islamic Relief Organization IIRO a group directly under the Muslim World League itself considered the political instrument of the Saudi ulemas Islamic scholars It was not until August 3 2006 that the IIRO offices appeared on the official list of organizations financing terrorism according to the US Department of the Treasury Throughout July 2000 two years after the attacks in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam the authors of this memo doubt the sincerity of the public positions taken by bin Laden s family It seems more and more likely that bin Laden has maintained contacts with certain members of his family although the family which directs one of the largest groups of public works in the world has officially renounced him One of his brothers apparently plays a role as intermediary in its professional contacts or the monitoring of its business According to Lorenzi it was his recurring doubts and more specifically the ambivalence of the IIRO which led the DGSE to work together with the Quai d Orsay the Foreign Ministry in Paris when French diplomats would propose an international convention to the UN against the financing of terrorism Another note from DGSE dated September 13 2001 entitled Elements on the financial resources of bin Laden repeats the suspicions regarding the Saudi Binladin Group the family empire It speaks of a powerful banker once close to the royal family as the chief architect of a plan that seems to have been used for the transfer to the terrorist of funds that came from the Gulf countries An annex to this memorandum of September 13 2001 lists the assets supposedly under Osama bin Laden s direct control Surprise In the middle of the known structures that the Sheikh managed in Sudan Yemen Malaysia and Bosnia a hotel situated in Mecca in Saudi Arabia still figures in 2001 Alain Chouet is skeptical about the desire on the part of Saudi authorities to capture bin Laden before September 11 His loss of Saudi nationality is nothing but a farce As far as I know no one did anything in fact to capture him between 1998 and 2001 And a document backs this up a report from October 2 2001 The departure of Prince Turki al Faisal head of Saudi intelligence a political eviction which reveals the underside of this spectacular firing just before September 11 The authors underscore the limits of Saudi influence especially in Kandahar Prince Turki was not able during his recent trips to Kandahar to convince those he met with to extradite bin Laden And 6 years later In a large report of the DGSE dated June 6 2005 that we were able to peruse and entitled Saudi Arabia A Kingdom in Danger a picture is painted in which the Saudi regime is doing more to combat al Qaeda Nonetheless some paragraphs betray remaining doubts about the real desire of the Saudis The French secret services are still anxious about the penchant for holy war among some Saudi doctors of the faith ulema 11 septembre 2001 les Français en savaient long Guillaume Dasquié Le Monde 16 04 07 est une impressionnante masse de documents De loin on croirait une thèse universitaire De près rien à voir Des coups de tampons rouges confidentiel défense et usage strictement national sur chacune des pages En haut à gauche un logo bleu roi celui de la DGSE la Direction générale des services extérieurs les services secrets français Au total 328 pages classifiées Notes rapports synthèses cartes graphiques organigrammes photos satellite Le tout exclusivement consacré à Al Qaida ses chefs sous chefs planques et camps d entraînement A ses soutiens financiers aussi Rien de moins que l essentiel des rapports de la DGSE rédigés entre juillet 2000 et octobre 2001 Une véritable encyclopédie Au terme de plusieurs mois d enquête sur cette documentation très spéciale nous prenons contact avec le quartier général de la DGSE Et le 3 avril l actuel chef de cabinet Emmanuel Renoult nous reçoit sur place dans l enceinte de la caserne des Tourelles à Paris Après avoir parcouru les 328 pages que nous posons sur son bureau il ne peut s empêcher de déplorer une telle fuite tout en nous laissant entendre que ce paquet représente la quasi intégralité des productions de la DGSE sur le sujet pour cette période cruciale En revanche sur le fond impossible de lui soutirer le moindre commentaire Trop sensible Il est vrai que ces chroniques des services secrets sur Al Qaida avec leurs diverses révélations soulèvent quantité de questions Et d abord une surprise le nombre élevé de notes uniquement consacrées aux menaces d Al Qaida contre les Etats Unis des mois avant les attaques suicides de New York et de Washington Neuf rapports entiers sur le sujet entre septembre 2000 et août 2001 Dont une note de synthèse de cinq pages intitulée Projet de détournement d avion par des islamistes radicaux et marquée d une date 5 janvier 2001 Huit mois avant le 11 Septembre la DGSE y rapporte les discussions tactiques menées depuis le début de l année 2000 entre Oussama Ben Laden et ses alliés talibans au sujet d une opération de détournement d avions de ligne américains Pierre Antoine Lorenzi chef de cabinet du patron de la DGSE jusqu en août 2001 aujourd hui président d une société spécialisée dans les stratégies de crise et d influence Serenus Conseil parcourt devant nous ces 328 pages et tombe en arrêt lui aussi sur cette note Il hésite prend le temps de la lire et admet Je me souviens de celle là Il faut se rappeler précise M Lorenzi que jusqu en 2001 le détournement d avion n a pas la même signification qu après le 11 Septembre A l époque cela implique de forcer un appareil à se poser sur un aéroport pour mener des négociations On est habitué à gérer ça Mise en perspective utile pour comprendre pourquoi cette alerte du 5 janvier n a provoqué aucune réaction chez ses destinataires les piliers du pouvoir exécutif Dès janvier 2001 la direction d Al Qaida se montre néanmoins transparente aux yeux et aux oreilles des espions français Les rédacteurs détaillent même les désaccords entre terroristes sur les modalités pratiques du détournement envisagé Jamais ils ne doutent de leur intention Provisoirement les djihadistes privilégient la capture d un avion entre Francfort et les Etats Unis Ils établissent une liste de sept compagnies possibles Deux seront finalement choisies par les pirates du 11 Septembre American Airlines et United Airlines voir fac similé Dans son introduction l auteur de la note annonce Selon les services ouzbeks de renseignement le projet d un détournement d avion semble avoir été discuté en début d année 2000 lors d une réunion à Kaboul entre des représentants de l organisation d Oussama Ben Laden Des espions ouzbeks renseignent donc les agents français A l époque l opposition des fondamentalistes musulmans au régime pro américain de Tachkent s est fédérée dans le Mouvement islamique d Ouzbékistan le MIO Une faction militaire de ce parti emmenée par un certain Taher Youdachev a rejoint les camps d Afghanistan et prêté allégeance à Oussama Ben Laden lui promettant d exporter son djihad en Asie centrale Des livrets militaires et des correspondances du MIO trouvés dans des camps afghans d Al Qaida en attestent Alain Chouet a gardé en mémoire cet épisode Il a dirigé jusqu en octobre 2002 le Service de renseignement de sécurité la subdivision de la DGSE chargée de suivre les mouvements terroristes Selon lui la crédibilité du canal ouzbek trouve son origine dans les alliances passées par le général Rachid Dostom l un des principaux chefs de guerre afghans d ethnie ouzbek lui aussi et qui combat alors les talibans Pour plaire à ses protecteurs des services de sécurité de l Ouzbékistan voisin Dostom a infiltré certains de ses hommes au sein du MIO jusque dans les structures de commandement des camps d Al Qaida C est ainsi qu il renseigne ses amis de Tachkent en sachant que ses informations cheminent ensuite vers Washington Londres ou Paris La formulation de la note française de janvier 2001 indique clairement que d autres sources corroborent ces renseignements sur les plans d Al Qaida Selon un dispositif bien huilé en Afghanistan la DGSE ne se contente pas d échanges avec des services secrets amis Pour percer les secrets des camps d une part elle manipule et retourne des jeunes candidats au djihad originaires des banlieues des grandes villes d Europe D autre part elle envoie des hommes du service action auprès de l Alliance du Nord du commandant Massoud Sans compter les interceptions des téléphones satellitaires Un proche de Pierre Brochand l actuel patron de la DGSE nous a assuré que le service disposait d une cellule Oussama Ben Laden depuis au moins 1995 L alerte du 5 janvier s appuie donc sur un système éprouvé Alain Chouet après nous avoir demandé de préciser qu il ne s exprimait pas au nom des institutions françaises reste laconique mais clair Il est rare qu on transmette un papier sans recouper D autant que ledit papier suit et précède de multiples rapports de la DGSE étayant la crédibilité des incantations guerrières d Oussama Ben Laden Dans sa note la DGSE estime enfin que la volonté d Al Qaida de concrétiser son acte de piraterie contre un appareil américain ne laisse aucun doute Au mois d octobre 2000 Oussama Ben Laden a assisté à une réunion en Afghanistan au cours de laquelle la décision de principe de mener cette opération a été maintenue Nous sommes le 5 janvier 2001 les dés sont jetés les Français le savent Et ils ne sont pas les seuls Comme toutes les informations évoquant des risques contre des intérêts américains la note a été transmise à la CIA par le service des relations extérieures de la DGSE responsable des coopérations entre alliés renommé depuis service des liaisons Son premier destinataire est le chef de poste de la CIA à Paris Bill Murray un francophone au physique de John Wayne rentré depuis aux États Unis Nous avons pu établir le contact mais M Murray n a pas souhaité donner suite à nos demandes Pierre Antoine Lorenzi dont les responsabilités à la DGSE couvraient alors les questions relatives à la coopération avec les agences étrangères ne conçoit pas que ces renseignements là ne lui aient pas été remis Ça typiquement c est le genre d information qui est transmise à la CIA Ce serait même une faute de ne pas l avoir fait De l autre côté de l Atlantique deux anciens agents de la CIA spécialistes d Al Qaida que nous avons sollicités ne se souviennent pas d alertes particulières envoyées par la DGSE Ni Gary Berntsen rattaché à la direction des opérations de l agence de 1982 à 2005 ni Michael Scheuer ancien responsable de l unité Ben Laden au siège de la CIA n ont gardé en mémoire des informations spécifiques en provenance de la DGSE A Washington la commission d enquête du Congrès sur le 11 Septembre dans son rapport final publié en juillet 2004 a mis l accent sur l incapacité du FBI de la CIA ou des services d immigration d agréger des données éparses visant certains membres des commandos du 11 Septembre A aucun moment la commission n a évoqué la possibilité que la CIA aurait répercuté au pouvoir politique dès janvier 2001 des renseignements émanant des services français sur le choix tactique d Oussama Ben Laden d organiser des détournements d avions américains Au delà le plus confondant à la lecture des 328 pages de la DGSE tient peut être dans la juxtaposition entre les notes qui alertent sur des menaces comme celle de janvier 2001 et celles qui décrivent très tôt et avec minutie le fonctionnement de l organisation Dès le 24 juillet 2000 avec la rédaction d un rapport de treize pages intitulé Les réseaux d Oussama Ben Laden l essentiel se révèle consigné noir sur jaune pâle la couleur des originaux de la DGSE Le contexte les détails anecdotiques et tous les aspects stratégiques relatifs à Al Qaida y figurent déjà Bien souvent les documents ultérieurs se contentent de les préciser Ainsi l hypothèse de la mort de Ben Laden qui a connu un certain succès en septembre 2006 prend dans cette note du 24 juillet 2000 les intonations d un refrain connu mais néanmoins fondé L ex Saoudien qui vit depuis plusieurs années dans des conditions précaires se déplaçant sans cesse de camp en camp souffre également de problèmes rénaux et dorsaux Des rumeurs récurrentes font état de sa mort prochaine mais il ne paraît pas avoir jusqu à présent changé ses habitudes de vie Sur un cliché aérien du 28 août 2000 les agents de la DGSE localisent un homme clé très proche d Oussama Ben Laden Son nom Abou Khabab Cet artificier d origine égyptienne connu pour avoir enseigné la science des explosifs artisanaux à des générations de djihadistes constitue une cible en théorie prioritaire Dans deux notices biographiques sur ce personnage du 25 octobre 2000 et du 9 janvier 2001 la DGSE énumère les renseignements échangés avec le Mossad israélien la CIA et les services de sécurité égyptiens à son sujet On n ignore rien de son parcours et de ses déplacements C est également le cas d Omar Chabani l

    Original URL path: http://www.abledangerblog.com/2007/04/translated-article-from-le-monde.html (2016-02-13)
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  • Able Danger Blog: French knew al Qaeda was planning hijacking
    the network after al Qaeda s attacks on U S embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 More details from the AP France s foreign intelligence service learned as early as January 2001 that al Qaida was preparing a hijacking plot likely to involve a U S airplane former intelligence officials said Monday confirming a report that also said the CIA received the warning Le Monde newspaper said it had obtained 328 pages of classified documents on Osama bin Laden s terror network that were drawn up by the French spy service the DGSE between July 2000 and October 2001 The documents included a Jan 5 2001 intelligence report warning that al Qaida was at work on a hijacking plot Pierre Antoine Lorenzi the former chief of staff for the agency s director at the time said he remembered the note and that it mentioned only the vague outlines of a hijacking plot nothing that foreshadowed the scale of the Sept 11 2001 attacks It wasn t about a specific airline or a specific day it was not a precise plot Lorenzi told The Associated Press It was a note that said They are preparing a plot to hijack an airplane and they have cited several companies The Sept 11 commission s report on the four hijacked flights has detailed repeated warnings about al Qaida and its desire to attack airlines in the months before Sept 11 2001 In a version declassified last September the report shows that the Federal Aviation Administration s intelligence unit received nearly 200 pieces of threat related information daily from U S intelligence agencies particularly the FBI CIA and State Department The French warning part of which was published in Le Monde detailed initial rumblings about the plot In early 2000 in Kabul Afghanistan bin Laden met with Taliban leaders and members of armed groups from Chechnya and discussed the possibility of hijacking a plane that would take off from Frankfurt Germany the note said citing Uzbek intelligence The note listed potential targets American Airlines Delta Airlines Continental Airlines United Airlines Air France and Lufthansa The list also included a mention of US Aero but it was unclear exactly what that referred to Two of the airlines United and American were targeted months later on Sept 11 Lorenzi said details of the threat would certainly have been passed along to the CIA though he was unable to specifically confirm that they had been That s the kind of information concerning a friendly country that we communicate he said If you don t do it it s an error He also stressed that officials could not say whether the plot they outlined in January 2001 was an early warning about the attacks to come in September At the time Lorenzi said officials had heard echoes only about a standard hijacking they had no idea al Qaida planned to slam planes into buildings let alone the World Trade Center and the Pentagon Uzbek officials apparently tipped off

    Original URL path: http://www.abledangerblog.com/2007/04/french-knew-al-qaeda-was-planning.html (2016-02-13)
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  • Able Danger Blog: DeVecchio subpoenas Lance and Clemente
    attorney s office It s an expensive litigation said DeVecchio s lawyer Douglas Grover who declined to comment further A highly informed source confirmed the Justice Department contributions saying It s on an hourly rate Not a top New York City rate more like a federal public defenders rate It could not immediately be determined how much the department is paying There is a process in place by which employees or former FBI employees who are the subject of civil litigation or criminal charges can apply for coverage of their legal costs The recommendation is forwarded to the Department of Justice where a final determination is made FBI spokesman John Miller said In a case that rocked New York law enforcement DeVecchio 66 was indicted last year for providing information on informants and mob rivals to Colombo family boss Gregory Scarpa before the murders DeVecchio who spent 33 years as an agent is also charged with receiving payoffs from Scarpa totaling more than 66 000 Now dead Scarpa was DeVecchio s top secret informant for more than a decade beginning in 1982 The murders occurred during the brutal Colombo family wars of the late 1980s and early 90s Grover DeVecchio and numerous agents who worked with him maintain he is innocent of the charges and that the Brooklyn DA s prosecution is baseless and misguided It also appears the FBI may be obstructing the investigation FBI DA fight over mob agent BY WILLIAM SHERMAN DAILY NEWS STAFF WRITER Saturday April 7th 2007 4 00 AM The FBI and the Brooklyn district attorney s office are battling over documents critical to the prosecution of a former federal agent accused of helping a mobster kill his rivals sources said yesterday Information about former agent Lindley DeVecchio s Mafia informant Greg Scarpa Sr once a captain in the Colombo crime family is crucial to the prosecution s case the sources said The district attorney s office has asked the FBI for batches of material on Scarpa including his FBI informant file going back to 1962 and files on other informants according to sources close to the probe But months have gone by and nothing has been delivered to the district attorney s office even though DeVecchio s trial is scheduled to begin later this spring The district attorney s office declined comment yesterday FBI spokesman John Miller said the agency has cooperated with Brooklyn prosecutors from the outset Miller also said the Brooklyn U S attorney s office is having discussions with local prosecutors over how and what information will be shared Scarpa died in 1994 DeVecchio is 65 retired and living in Florida In the murder case DeVecchio allegedly gave Scarpa top secret FBI information on Scarpa s Mafia rivals and other informants leading directly to the killings The controversy over the district attorney s requests for information also came up during a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on March 27 Referring to the DeVecchio case Sen Charles Grassley R Iowa said I

    Original URL path: http://www.abledangerblog.com/2007/04/devecchio-subpoenas-lance-and-clemente.html (2016-02-13)
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  • Able Danger Blog: No response on probe into Weldon leak
    as a hearing appearance approaches Although the Committee was informed weeks ago to expect your answers to our questions on a rolling basis we have yet to receive a single answer Please ensure that the Committee receives your answers to the oversight questions from the January 18th hearing without further delay Among the questions he was asked back in January Gonzales also said in January that he would try to provide the senators with more information on a variety of topics including an investigation into leaks from an FBI probe concerning former Pennsylvania Republican Curt Weldon whether Congress has the authority to prevent the president from increasing troop levels in Iraq the ways in which the department was sharing gun trace data with state and local law enforcement agencies the number of prosecutors and investigators assigned to dealing with contracting fraud in Iraq and details on the case of the Canadian extraordinary rendition victim Maher Arar posted by Supporter 11 16 PM View our Able Danger timeline Read Tony Shaffer s testimony Listen to audio of the hearing Browse the hearing transcript Demand more news coverage Support a new investigation Add a banner to your site Disclaimer WWW Able Danger Blog About Us Vi is QT Monster Mike is TopDog08 Voxott is Voice of the Taciturn Email Us Contact at AbleDangerBlog Com Links Able Danger Overview Able Danger Twenty Questions Latest Able Danger Video Clips Able Danger Press Conference Able Danger Hearing Testimony Whistleblower Hearing Video Able Danger Timeline Able Danger on Google News Able Danger on Technorati Able Danger on Google Blogs Able Danger at Wikipedia Able Danger on CNN Congressman Curt Weldon Journalist Peter Lance Radiohost Dirk Thompson Intelligence Summit News Able Danger Video Links Able Danger Bloggers Related Books Related Blogs Armies of Liberation Gary Swenchonis Sr

    Original URL path: http://www.abledangerblog.com/2007/04/no-response-on-probe-into-weldon-leak.html (2016-02-13)
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  • Able Danger Blog: LTC Shaffer removed from command
    s command changed swamp training to include more food and sleep for trainees and requiring trainers to go into potentially high water before their trainees do 3 No evidence exists to suggest that Jackman suffered any career related consequences due to the incident Following his command at the Ranger Training Brigade Jackman served as the Director of Combined Arms and Tactics at the United States Army Infantry School at Fort Benning as well as the Deputy J3 for Training and Readiness United States Pacific Command USPACOM Hawaii He was then assigned as Chief of Staff 10th Mountain Division Light Infantry Fort Drum New York during which he participated as part of NATO s Follow on Force in Operation Joint Forge Bosnia Herzegovina Shortly thereafter he was made Assistant Division Commander for Support for the 10th Mountain Division Jackman served as Director of Operations United States Southern Command USSOUTHCOM from 2001 2003 concentrating mostly on anti drug and anti terrorism endeavours As you might recall the DIA went to great efforts to get LTC Shaffer s security clearance revoked over what amounted to 200 in travel expenses and cell phone bills Nonetheless Representative Chris Shays pulled through for Tony and got his security clearance restored on a temporary basis As a result Tony was assigned to command the Special Troops Battalion 9th Theater Support Command at Fort Belvior Virginia on November 5 2006 Of course when Major General Jackman heard about this he immediately took action to attempt to have LTC Shaffer removed from his command Exactly how that meshes with Jackman s role as the Congressional Liaison for the U S Army is not clear unless you suppose that undue Congressional oversight for a military operation like Able Danger that could have prevented 9 11 might still be keeping him

    Original URL path: http://www.abledangerblog.com/2007/05/ltc-shaffer-removed-from-command.html (2016-02-13)
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  • Able Danger Blog: Senators want CIA to release 9/11 report
    In a statement Thursday his spokesman Mark Mansfield said the CIA director wants the agency to learn from any past mistakes but doesn t want to dwell on them Given the formidable national security challenges our nation faces now and down the road General Hayden believes it is essential for the Agency to move forward Mansfield said That s where our emphasis needs to be The agency s actions prior to Sept 11 have gotten renewed attention with the release of a memoir by former CIA director George Tenet He has been criticized for not doing more to warn Bush about the al Qaida threat In interviews about his memoir he has said instead he worked the bureaucracy beneath the president by asking then National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and others for action Bond said some intelligence officials have dismissed the inspector general s report as ancient history which he doesn t accept He said the report has additional information which would be useful to the public We have no desire to embarrass or throw cold water on the enthusiasm of the great men and women of the CIA but let s just take a clear and open look at what the IG found and see if we have all of those problems corrected Bond said In an October 2005 statement Goss said the officers involved in counterterrorism were stars who had excelled in their areas singled out by the CIA to take on difficult assignments Unfortunately time and resources were not on their side despite their best efforts to meet unprecedented challenges he said Goss rejected a recommendation from CIA Inspector General John Helgerson that the agency form accountability review boards to examine any personal culpability Bond said that move was regrettable In his statement Goss also noted that the agency had received a Freedom of Information Act request for the report and that a review process was ongoing But the CIA has not released any documents to The Associated Press or other organizations that began requesting the information at least 20 months ago The law requires agencies to respond to requests within 20 days but officials rarely meet those deadlines and often blame lengthy backlogs Groups including the National Security Archive have clashed with the agency over its FOIA policies Last year the archive gave the CIA its prize for the agency with the worst FOIA record Called the Rosemary Award it s named after President Nixon s secretary Rosemary Woods who erased 18 minutes of a key Watergate conversation on the White House tapes The citation noted that CIA s oldest FOIA requests could apply for drivers licenses in most states CIA has for three decades been one of the worst FOIA agencies archive Director Thomas Blanton said this week Many of the individuals highlighted in the inspector general s report are likely to have retired But some are believed still to be in senior government positions making the report s findings even more sensitive at the

    Original URL path: http://www.abledangerblog.com/2007/05/senators-want-cia-to-release-911-report.html (2016-02-13)
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  • Able Danger Blog: A Resurgent Menace
    s most wanted men Ayman al Zawahiri bin Laden s deputy managed to issue at least 15 propaganda missives last year The tribal areas are now riddled with a burgeoning network of al Qaeda training camps We re seeing less brick and mortar operations in terms of training and more transient facilities that al Qaeda uses for its training and for operations planning purposes says a U S intelligence official Much of their training is opportunistic whatever they can do whenever they can do it wherever they can do it There is apparently no shortage of trainers or occasions for students to practice their lessons in neighboring Afghanistan where al Qaeda has been forging closer ties with the revitalized Taliban Pakistan has been an American ally against al Qaeda but U S officials are increasingly frustrated by its inability or unwillingness to crack down in the tribal regions The Pakistanis do just enough to avoid jeopardizing U S support says Daniel Byman a former CIA analyst who teaches at Georgetown University U S options for operating there are very limited You would put Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf at risk and you would face a heavily armed not only adversary but population says a senior U S intelligence official There was one event in particular last year that prompted the intelligence community to rethink al Qaeda Authorities in Britain last summer disrupted a plot to down airliners bound for the United States using liquid explosives At the time experts said that the sophisticated plan to simultaneously hit multiple targets bore the hallmarks of al Qaeda Now a senior U S government official tells U S News that the liquid explosives plot has been traced back conclusively to midlevel operational elements of al Qaeda in Pakistan Another concern The explosives could have worked suggesting that al Qaeda has managed to replace the bomb makers it has lost What the British plot showed us was that they had people to backfill and people who were pretty smart the official adds This was pretty damn clever British investigators also found that despite initial conclusions to the contrary earlier plots like the July 2005 London subway bombings were also planned with the active participation of al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan In case after case the hand of core al Qaeda can be clearly seen Peter Clarke Scotland Yard s counterterrorism chief said in a recent speech Two of the subway bombers along with the leader of a group of five British citizens convicted last week of plotting to blow up a nightclub and power plants in London with fertilizer bombs allegedly attended training camps together in Pakistan and met Abdul al Hadi al Iraqi a senior al Qaeda figure now in U S custody at Guantanamo Bay Conveyor belt At the same time the broader movement inspired by al Qaeda has only grown bigger largely because of the group s powerful propaganda machine Bin Laden and Zawahiri have been able to fill in the gaps

    Original URL path: http://www.abledangerblog.com/2007/05/resurgent-menace.html (2016-02-13)
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