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  • Globalisation, criminels, mafias, trafics et corruption... - Transversaux
    la délinquance traditionnelle des gangs urbains des milieux du grand banditisme local mais également depuis quelque temps dans les milieux de la petite délinquance On n hésite plus désormais à utiliser des armes de guerre pour des causes encore indéterminées Dans le cadre de la mondialisation les trafics d armements sont beaucoup moins évidents à connaître que les trafics de drogue Les clients que ce soit des mouvements de guérilla ou les groupes issus des milieux sont en général très discrets Ce trafic peut être également semi légal dès lors que des opérateurs sans liens directs avec les mafias viennent rendre des services et permettre à certains états en situation de crise de contourner les embargos Ces opérations permettent d ailleurs des versements de commissions qui alimentent des comptes dans des banques off shore avant d être réinvestis dans l économie légale Il semblerait que l affaire judiciaire qui a impliqué un ancien ministre de l intérieur en France ait relevé de cette catégorie même si l on ne peut préjuger de l implication du personnage en l état actuel Appel en cours Jean Michel Dasque page 52 présente également les Anciennes et nouvelles organisations criminelles en Asie orientale Un sujet qui est illustré par une superbe carte qui pourrait illustrer un cours de géographie de terminale sur cet espace Les triades chinoises se sont développées après la victoire des communistes en Chine en 1949 dans la diaspora d Asie du Sud et dans les Chinatown étasuniennes Les liens familiaux les transferts d argent liquide permettant de développer des commerces facilitent l activité et l opacité des réseaux Au niveau des réseaux criminels liés aux triades le point de départ de l expansion se situe après 1949 avec la défaite des nationalistes de Jiang Jiesi Les débris de l armée républicaine qui ne se sont pas repliés sur l île de Formose se sont organisés en guérillas au nord de la Thaïlande et de la Birmanie C est le point de départ du célèbre triangle d or la zone de production d opium la plus célèbre même si le premier rang en quantité produite est actuellement tenu par l Afghanistan malgré la présence occidentale Ces triades ont pu prospérer dans toute l Asie du Sud est en s appuyant sur la diaspora chinoise a qui elles pouvaient garantir en contrepartie d une coûteuse extorsion une certaine protection de ces populations souvent victimes en Malaisie comme en Indonésie de pogroms L auteur de cet article dresse également un historique de la piraterie en Asie du Sud Est On espérait dans ce numéro trouver la signature de Pierre Arnaud Chouvy et l on n est pas déçu Géographe attaché au CNRS il est le producteur d un site qui fait référence par la qualité de ses informations geopium org Dans l article Trafic de drogue les routes de l héroïne entre l Asie et l Europe page 63 Pierre Arnaud Chouvy présente les circuits traditionnels terrestres et difficiles et les nouveaux qui

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  • Le sommet de Copenhague sur le climat : bilan - Transversaux
    est ainsi contentée de prendre acte de l accord de Copenhague obtenu in extremis la veille D ici à janvier 2010 les pays doivent afficher leurs objectifs mais aucune contrainte juridique ne pèsera sur eux Ainsi l accord n impose pas aux Etats de mettre en place un traité pour prendre le relais du protocole de Kyoto qui expirera en 2012 La conférence de Mexico sur le climat prévue en décembre 2010 aura fort à faire pour remettre en route un processus mal engagé par un accord qui ne prévoit aucune échéance pour la conclusion d un traité Français AFP Paris Conférence de Copenhague l amertume d un accord a minima sur le climat Anne Chaon Jérôme Cartillier 20 12 2009 Voir Le Devoir Montréal Analyse L après Copenhague s annonce laborieux Louis Gilles Francoeur 21 12 2009 Voir Anglais ABC Sydney History s long shadow Clive Hamilton 21 12 2009 Voir Los Angeles Times USA Climate summit ends with major questions Breakthrough or cop out Jim Tankersley 19 12 2009 Voir Allemand Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Francfort Zur Kenntnis Joachim Müller Jung 20 12 2009 Voir Die Welt Hambourg Tohuwabohu mit Tuvalu Daniel Wetzel Claudia Ehrenstein 20 12 2009 Voir Espagnol El País Madrid Obama sabe jugar a todas las bandas y ganar Antonio Caño 20 12 2009 Voir La Vanguardia Barcelone Un tratado congelado Antonio Cerrillo 20 12 2009 Voir Italien Il Messaggero Rome Clima a Copenaghen missione fallita Sì a fatica ad accordo non vincolante 20 12 2009 Voir La Stampa Turin Il primo confronto Nord Sud Maurizio Molinari 19 12 2009 Voir Consultez l ensemble des revues de presse de l ISIT Voir L ISIT Institut de management et de communication interculturels forme depuis 1957 de véritables experts en langues étrangères dotés d une très grande culture

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  • Pensée stratégique : quelles priorités ? - Transversaux
    vitesse du changement et la capacité émotionnelle de l être humain et donc de nos sociétés à s adapter à ce changement Qu est ce qui résulte de cette multiplication d acteurs de moyens conflictuels et de vulnérabilités Dans ce contexte quel rôle pour l Etat Tout d abord le rôle de l Etat devient paradoxalement plus important Les nouveaux défis demandent une réaction aussi diversifiée et intégrée que la nouvelle menace Ce n est que l Etat qui en est capable Car le système international reste malgré ses progrès importants toujours embryonnaire C est particulièrement vrai dans le domaine sécuritaire L ONU reste otage du consensus ou de l absence d un tel consensus de ses membres et du Conseil de sécurité L OTAN ne couvre toujours que la dimension militaire classique malgré les approches partiellement nouvelles en Afghanistan L Union européenne n a guère fait que commencer à se doter de l éventail d instruments nécessaires dans le domaine sécuritaire En Afrique et dans les autres parties du monde le constat est identique Devant cette absence d instruments efficaces globaux c est l Etat et sa capacité à coordonner ses actions avec d autres Etats et avec des organismes multilatéraux qui est obligé d assumer la responsabilité Or l Etat est aujourd hui sous siège Le monopole étatique de la force légitime est dans bien des pays mis ouvertement en question Le nombre des failed states des Etats faillis dominés par des seigneurs de guerre qui construisent leur pouvoir sur des enfants soldats et la criminalité ce nombre risque d augmenter avec des conséquences catastrophiques non seulement pour les populations affectées mais aussi pour leurs voisins la stabilité régionale et la sécurité mondiale Pire la capacité de l Etat de gagner la course contre la criminalité organisée et d autres menaces n est nullement assurée Le temps ne joue pas nécessairement en notre faveur En outre certaines réactions de l Etat tel que le recours croissant aux sociétés militaires privées les SMP risquent d augmenter les dilemmes Alors Sto Djela Quoi faire comme disait V I Lénine Décloisonner la pensée stratégique Je pense qu il faut comprendre tout d abord que la menace est devenue sécuritaire au sens large du mot Les forces armées continuent d être un pilier important et indispensable dans la formulation de notre réponse mais seulement un élément parmi bien d autres Il nous faut dépasser la pensée unidimensionnelle au niveau stratégique opérationnel et tactique et parvenir à des réponses sécuritaires et intégrées Pour parer au défi du futur il nous faut penser hors case Il faut engager une réforme profonde du secteur sécuritaire qui se base sur une vision globale du problème sur ce que les Allemands appellent une Gesamtschau Les Nations Unies et l Union européenne ont fait un pas dans cette direction en reconnaissant qu il y a une relation directe entre la sécurité l établissement d un Etat de droit et le développement Sans sécurité il ne peut pas y

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  • in 1981 a PhD in political sciences with a thesis on nuclear proliferation Winkler joined the Swiss Department of Defence in late 1981 as an international security expert In 1985 he was appointed Representative of the Chief of Staff for Politico Military Affairs in 1995 Head of the newly created Division for International Security Policy In 1998 he was promoted to the rank of Deputy Head Security and Defence Policy Winkler has been on 13 June 2000 appointed by the Swiss Federal Council Director of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces DCAF and promoted to the rank of Ambassador Winkler s professional affiliations include membership in the Council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies IISS in London the Geneva Centre for Security Policy GCSP and the Gulf Research Center Geneva as well as membership in the international advisory boards of the Bonn Centre for Conversion BICC the International Coalition of Women Defending Peace the Geneva Centre for Security Policy GCSP and other academic and international bodies Source http www dcaf ch Ses articles pour Diploweb com Pensée stratégique quelles priorités Il faut d urgence décloisonner la pensée stratégique On ne peut plus différencier artificiellement entre

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  • Nuclear deterrence — the permanent and the changing - Transversaux
    aggressor in the position of taking a decision on whether to escalate from the conventional to the nuclear level 11 To achieve this NATO had to have sufficiently well organised conventional forces to resist any Warsaw Pact aggression in such a manner that responsibility for escalation and hence for starting nuclear war would rest with the USSR and not the Alliance within which it would in any case have been very difficult to gain agreement on the point The Americans suspected that the Europeans would have wanted to drag them into an intercontinental nuclear exchange as soon as possible and the Europeans suspected that flexible response was simply a planning tool for limiting any nuclear exchange to European soil The question of circumvention of nuclear deterrence is still alive today even though the problem is presented in rather different terms Western countries are now far more at ease than they were at the time of the Cold War an era in which to quote General de Gaulle the Warsaw Pact divisions were just a step away from doing the Tour de France and Soviet nuclear forces were directly threatening the United States Today the theatre of war has largely been removed from Europe and the very survival of the European continent is no longer at stake any more than that of the United States However the question remains how to exercise deterrence in operational theatres in which what is currently at stake does not always justify its nuclear aspect For sure the shadow cast by Western nuclear deterrence is a strong encouragement to prudence on the part of those countries wishing to upset the regional or global balance through the use or threat of use of military might but it is also proof if proof were needed that the question of what should be the structural link between the conventional and nuclear levels of deterrence is just as valid as it was in the era of flexible response if not more so Recent conflicts and operations in Afghanistan Iraq Georgia and the Indian Ocean have taught us that it is vital for the West to have sufficiently substantial diversified and effective conventional forces to be in a position to face up to attempts to destabilise a country politically as in Georgia or an entire region Afghanistan or to asymmetric conditions as in Iraq Afghanistan and the Indian Ocean Despite these lessons developments in Western armed forces since the end of the Cold War are hardly encouraging While operations in theatres sometimes far removed from Europe are becoming more numerous the structure of European conventional armed forces has continued to shrink and plans for procurement training and maintenance stand out by their inadequacy in adaptation to new tasks in capability and in number This was the subject of lively debate during the preparation of the French White Paper on defence and national security and has resulted in a policy that it is hoped will succeed There is little doubt that it will also be examined closely during the United Kingdom s defence review which is planned to start in 2010 Deterrence is universal and today its many components have to be developed in a balanced manner We are no longer in an era in which Europeans can resort to the American nuclear guarantee and overlook their conventional forces Nuclear deterrence and missile defence As a result of renewed interest in missile defence nuclear deterrence is today undergoing a qualitative development that is both positive and negative Such defence is once again becoming an important element to be taken into account in the equation it can serve to strengthen deterrence against states that would not hesitate to use conventional assets or even weapons of mass destruction to threaten the West On the other hand it also acts as a constraint when determining the size of deterrent force needed to be in a position to overcome potential adversaries defences particularly for medium sized nuclear powers such as the United Kingdom and France Missile defence plays an important role in underpinning deterrence and is a natural complement to it 12 The nature of the ballistic threat to Western interests has changed over the years and the threat posed by thousands of Soviet warheads will probably be replaced over the next 15 years by the nuclear warheads of states such as North Korea or Iran deployed on a relatively small number of medium range or intercontinental ballistic missiles Against such a small number of vehicles even limited defence could contribute to a significant reduction in the vulnerability of the European and American continents and therefore to deterring a rogue state from attacking them 13 The problem however is that if anti missile defence were developed by states that could potentially be the target of Western deterrence it could in turn present a problem for the credibility of nuclear deterrence as exercised by the medium sized nuclear powers that is the United Kingdom and France albeit not the United States at least not with the current configuration of its nuclear force 14 It should be remembered that when the Soviet Union established its missile defence system around Moscow in the 1970s the United Kingdom and France had to invest massively in penetration aids and MIRV warheads with reduced radar signature in order to give their deterrent forces the continued ability to penetrate those defences thus maintaining the credibility of threat to targets in the USSR The programmes concerned included Chevaline the Trident I C4 project M 4 and TN 71 and later Trident II D5 and M 45 TN 75 A number of countries including Russia and China are developing new ABM systems little is known of their effectiveness but it is probably far better than the systems of the 1970s principally because of the extraordinary technological progress made in the field In just a decade or two from now the United Kingdom and France will have to ask themselves what they need to do in order to maintain the effectiveness of their deterrent forces against new missile defence systems It is clear that missile defence will be the subject of careful study by the United Kingdom and France in the years to come particularly since it is hardly realistic to believe that a missile defence system could be organised and deployed on a strictly national basis It seems likely that such a system would be designed and organised within the framework of NATO which in turn will create problems of coordination and decision making on a political level because of the politically sensitive aspects of sovereignty 15 Extended nuclear deterrence the new order Extended nuclear deterrence can be defined as the express or implied promise given by a nuclear weapons state to one or more non nuclear weapons states to bring its deterrent forces to bear to guarantee their security against blackmail threat or aggression from third parties Extended deterrence therefore has both political and military dimensions During the Cold War the United States by virtue of the North Atlantic Treaty gave its Allies a nuclear guarantee against possible aggression by the Soviet Union affecting their territory Whether the United States would really bring its nuclear forces to bear in order to protect European allies what is known as coupling has been the subject of recurrent debate within the Alliance for more than 45 years In the wake of US Defence Secretary McNamara s speech to the Athens conference on flexible response the lack of credibility of the American commitment was one of France s pretexts for leaving NATO s integrated military structure In the same vein during the debate that ran from 1979 to 1987 on the deployment in Europe of intermediate range nuclear forces capable of reaching Soviet territory one of the fears expressed by the Allies was that unless such deployment took place the coupling with US strategic systems would be compromised 16 But at least the debate took place within a structured alliance having a formalised framework for consultation and decision making Of course NATO still exists today as do formal bilateral alliances between the United States and Japan and South Korea Nevertheless the United States is today in a position where the countries that most earnestly seek cover from its nuclear guarantee whether implicitly or explicitly have no formal alliance with it The same applies to a lesser extent to the United Kingdom and France the latter having developed strategic partnerships with several countries notably in the Persian Gulf The most extreme case is Taiwan with which the United States the United Kingdom and France have had no diplomatic relations for several decades Under these conditions the response to threats from Iran in particular against states on the western seaboard of the Persian Gulf or from China against Taiwan risks raising sensitive issues of the consultation that would be needed between potential or desirable guarantors and those countries who seek the guarantee For potential aggressors the situation has both clear advantages and serious risks in that any consultation on deterrence would take place in the absence of a clear framework of reference with defined limits on action A situation like this would be unstable and entail many risks and should not be considered lightly 17 Moreover in the case of blackmail intimidation or aggression by Iran against the Gulf States or by China against Taiwan it seems likely that the first line of defence would be conventional nuclear weapons must not be the sole element in the strategic landscape This brings us back to the problem discussed above of how conventional and nuclear forces should be organised However much the complex yet structured NATO system might be the rule with its allocation of roles common training of forces permanent military staffs and political dialogue between the Allies it is nevertheless likely that if there were a problem in the Gulf or in the Sea of Japan consultation would be ad hoc Confusion and difficulty in achieving rapid agreement on joint action would be the order of the day for the United States and its regional allies 18 Taking into account the new strategic situation and the fact that for the foreseeable future it is very unlikely that the United Kingdom or France would put their nuclear forces into action other than in close coordination with the United States it would seem desirable if it is not already the case that the US British and French governments consider some form of trilateral operational nuclear plan TRIOP that would allow them to plan the use or threat of use of their nuclear forces in conditions of conflict that involve all three of them 19 Desirable as such planning might be to bring together the policies of the three countries it would have to remain confidential because of criticisms of the West against the rest that it would doubtless foster and also because it would support the argument of states that want all British and French nuclear forces to be taken into account in any negotiations on nuclear disarmament Technological progress and conditions of use of nuclear weapons The mantra that Western political figures have repeated endlessly is that nuclear weapons are weapons of last resort They exist in order never to be used Such a declaratory posture however reassuring and politically acceptable it might be takes no account of the conditions in which deterrence might be exercised Quite clearly they would only be used outside the possessor s own country and military planners have doubtless set out in detail the conditions in which deterrence would be put into action should it be necessary The question of these conditions for use of nuclear weapons should nevertheless be examined if only because they govern in considerable measure the technological developments that lead to the production of the weapons and the vehicles that deliver them If there is too great a technological difference between the characteristics and performance of nuclear weapons which are well known to the military technical community that follows the subject and gets its information from both open and secret sources and the objectives that are set for them in the context of foreseeable conflicts nuclear deterrence is put at risk The nuclear weapon becomes self deterring since he who threatens to use it knows in advance that it is not possible for him to do so or at least only at an exorbitant political and perhaps military cost Moreover the possible adversary knows this too and the entire credibility of the deterrent force is undermined In this respect the British and the French face a particular problem the size and characteristics of their nuclear forces such as accuracy and power impose a number of serious constraints with regard to their use Put another way the level of the technology used means that the likely scenarios for use of their nuclear weapons are broadly predictable Such a situation is scarcely satisfactory given the increased diversity of threats today Clearly if we were to imagine British or French deterrence having to be exercised in anything other than a European context even though jointly with US deterrent forces the characteristics of the weapons used would be very different from those targeted for example against the vital centres of the former Soviet power It is sadly probable that the governments of countries such as Iran and North Korea have little regard for the survival of their populations yet act in general to preserve their own survival Saddam Hussein had already adopted this position having had a number of bunkers constructed to house himself and his henchmen in time of war whilst leaving the Iraqi population exposed 20 To protect against such a risk with regard to the credibility of French deterrence it is essential that as far as technology is concerned massive efforts be made to adapt the characteristics of nuclear weapons to the new threats and especially to potential new targets We still remember the controversy that a few years ago led to the United States s abandonment of the idea of developing penetrating nuclear warheads known as bunker busters intended to hit hardened targets such as the bunkers in which the leaders of rogue states would hide if attacked 21 This abandonment and the British and French refusal to develop such weapons could be considered a sign of a lack of determination by the United States the United Kingdom and France to equip themselves with the means to face up to aggressors or those who might potentially foment trouble and lead them to underestimate the risks of blackmail threat or aggression against a third party in an area considered strategic to Western security interests The United States has already made known that it is looking at the possibility of conventional bunker busters but the state of the French and especially the British defence budgets precludes such a costly consideration At a time when pointed questions are again being asked about the operational and technical credibility of deterrence the two European nuclear powers are faced with difficult choices Accuracy and penetration are factors that have significant budgetary impact and they have to be thought through with great care to avoid ending up with weapon systems whose operational and therefore political credibility is reduced purely through not having made the right choices at the right time Conclusion We have seen that nuclear deterrence remains topical As with anything constructed by man its nature changes and with it certain fundamental aspects of doctrine that we had once supposed inviolable In 2001 2006 and again in 2008 Presidents Chirac and Sarkozy presented some new visions of the use of nuclear weapons and the evolution of our deterrent doctrine What remains is to translate these visions into weapon programmes that are sufficiently flexible so that the exercise of deterrence by our country is not limited by technological constraints that reduce its operational and therefore political credibility On this very issue the results of analyses conducted in the United States for the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review NPR are currently being prepared and should be available in January 2010 They will be an interesting indication of probable developments in American strategy particularly with regard to exercising extended deterrence and the aim of reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons 22 Such development would not be without impact on British and French strategies even if the particular position of France is maintained for reasons of policies that have been long pursued relating to independence in scientific technological and operational matters 23 The questions raised over the exercise of deterrence have fundamentally changed It is to be hoped that they lead to a thorough review without taboo or prejudice by the military civilian and research personnel concerned This is the price if nuclear deterrence is to retain its relevance in the face of twenty first century threats Copyright novembre 2009 Debouzy Défense nationale Défense nationale et sécurité collective is a publication whose purpose is to tackle all national and international political economic social and scientific issues by considering them from the viewpoint of defence This specific aspect enabled it to outlive WW II and later on all the crises hardships and regime changes that followed Its readers in France all still share a common interest in defence and security despite any differences in opinion origins or political sensitivity www defnat com See Pourquoi et comment faire un don au Diploweb Mots clés NATO 2009 French White Paper on defence Nuclear weapons Conventional war Escalation Warsaw Pact Flexible response Missile defence Technical credibility NPR TRIOP Coupling Chevaline Trident Recommander cette page Votre adresse email Destinataire Texte de votre message Tweets de diploweb 1 Thomas Schelling The Strategy of Conflict Cambridge Mass Harvard University Press 1960 and new edition 1980 2 Bernard Brodie The Absolute Weapon Freeport NY Books for Libraries Press 1946 Also Hermann Kahn The Nature and feasibility of War and Deterrence RAND Corporation Paper P 18888 RC 1960 3 This despite several

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  • Paper on defence and national security Ses articles pour Diploweb com Nuclear deterrence the permanent and the changing Nuclear deterrence though much changed is as relevant today as ever If its material and manner of application have evolved its usefulness has Direction Directeur P Verluise Conseil scientifique Charte du site Faire un don Devenir membre Auteurs Proposer un article Synergies Présenter le site Conférences Partenaires Participer Proposer une synergie Liens

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  • Géopolitique des murs et des frontières. Pr. S. Rosière - Transversaux
    ancienne et relève plus nettement du contexte local partition de l empire des Inde en 1947 Des conflits plus récents expliquent aussi l existence de lignes de front invasion chinoise du Cachemire invasion turque de Chypre en 1974 Dans le cas de l Irak l invasion américaine 2003 et la guerre civile corrélative a engendré la construction de murs sur au moins deux dyades Arabie saoudite par les voisins de cet État inquiets de son évolution Il y a donc un lien avec un conflit sans que celui ci soit la cause directe Signalons aussi l existence du mur thaïlandais sur la frontière malaysienne ou du mur iranien sur la frontière pakistanaise dont le but est d empêcher des infiltrations déstabilisatrices depuis l autre côté de la frontière Les lignes de front qui représentent presque un quart du total du linéaire de murs frontaliers environ 9 000 km Les barrières migratoires Néanmoins les plus nombreuses séparent des États dépourvus de contentieux majeurs sur des frontières caractérisées par des flux migratoires causés par de fortes discontinuités de niveau de vie On peut les appeler des barrières migratoires Les migrations étant essentiellement le produit de déplacement de personnes pauvres en quête d emploi migrations dites économiques la position des barrières est relativement corrélée aux ruptures de niveau de vie aux discontinuités du bien être à l échelle planétaire et donc si l on veut aux frontières Nord Sud même si parfois la mer comme en Méditerranée fait office de murs néanmoins les détroits fermés forment bien une catégorie de murs Les barrières séparant pays riches et pauvres fondent l originalité des barrières frontalières contemporaines Les discontinuités de niveau de vie les plus fortes sont bien soulignées par des murs différentiels de PIB de 1 à 16 entre le Maroc et les Presidios espagnols et de 1 à 6 entre le Mexique et les Etats Unis la fracture Nord Sud est donc de plus en plus soulignée par un mur qui tend à devenir global Soulignons que des différentiels moins élevés peuvent générer des murs Ainsi le gouvernement du Botswana a érigé lui aussi une clôture de sécurité à sa frontière avec le Zimbabwe La dégradation de la situation économique et politique au Zimbabwe les habitants de ce pays beaucoup plus peuplé environ 13 millions d habitants contre 1 8 au Botswana se réfugient en masse au Botswana même illégalement plus de 100 000 immigrants zimbabwéens seraient installés dans ce pays Le gouvernement du Botswana a décidé en 2004 de fermer sa frontière avec son voisin septentrional et a édifié une clôture électrifiée haute de 2 4 m sur les 810 km de frontière commune Ainsi même au Sud la lutte contre l immigration illégale est une préoccupation importante Le cas de l Inde et du Bangladesh est intéressant Dans ce cas aussi le paramètre migratoire a été avancé par l Inde forte immigration bengalie et nombreuses expulsions mais et surtout depuis le 9 septembre 2001 la dimension terroriste a été souvent mise

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  • Audiovisuel Audio Photo Vidéo Accueil Stéphane ROSIERE Biographie mise à jour en 2009 Professeur Directeur du département de géographie Université de Reims Champagne Ardenne France Directeur de la revue Espace Politique http espacepolitique revues org i Ses articles pour Diploweb com Les murs en l an 2009 Les frontières fermées sur la carte jointe ci après sont constituées de trois catégories distinctes Les Marches frontières dénuées de points Les murs en l an 2009 20 ans après l ouverture du mur de Berlin Comme l a démontré le colloque organisé récemment à Montréal par la Chaire Raoul Dandurand le vingtième anniversaire de la chute du mur de Berlin ne L Espace Politique revue en ligne présentée par S Rosière Directeur L EP a pour objectif de favoriser la compréhension de l espace politique en présentant des modèles théoriques et des outils conceptuels appliqués à Direction Directeur P Verluise Conseil scientifique Charte du site Faire un don Devenir membre Auteurs Proposer un article Synergies Présenter le site Conférences Partenaires Participer Proposer une synergie Liens conseillés Archives Retrouvez la chaîne Diploweb sur Union européenne États membres Institutions Pays candidats Russie CEI Russie CEI Amérique Amérique du Nord Amérique centrale Amérique du Sud

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