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  • Géopolitique. La Russie de Vladimir Poutine - Russie
    sa politique les organisations criminelles transnationales OCT russes contrôlent encore une grande majorité des entreprises En août 1999 les attentats suicides commis par des Tchétchènes indépendantistes déstabilisent profondément la Russie et témoignent de l impasse de la politique antiterroriste du Kremlin La Russie refuse de leur accorder l indépendance principalement par crainte que l émancipation de la Tchétchénie ne soit le précurseur de celle de l ensemble des ex républiques de l URSS Vladimir Poutine déclenche une guerre meurtrière au cours de laquelle de graves exactions seront commises à l encontre de milliers de civils aussi bien par les forces fédérales russes que par les rebelles tchétchènes La Russie premier producteur mondial et exportateur de gaz 2e producteur mondial et exportateur majeur du pétrole premier fournisseur de l Union européenne détient actuellement une position géopolitique inégalée par laquelle elle tente de renforcer sa place d acteur majeur dans le jeu des grandes puissances mondiales telles que les Etats Unis et la Chine Mais les relations extérieures restent conflictuelles lorsqu il s agit notamment de l élargissement progressif de l UE plusieurs Etats se trouvant dans la zone d influence de la Russie souhaitant y adhérer En mars 2008 auront lieu les prochaines élections présidentielles si Vladimir Poutine ne peut se représenter après deux mandats successifs comme le stipule la Constitution il a d ores et déjà annoncé qu il dirigerait la liste de Russie Unie aux législatives de décembre 2007 Si le parti Russie Unie fort de sa popularité gagnait les législatives Vladimir Poutine pourrait rester au pouvoir en devenant Premier ministre voire président du parti tout en maintenant un homme de confiance au Kremlin NDLR V Poutine a été nommé Premier ministre en mai 2008 Nous vous proposons d accéder maintenant à un dossier en ligne Vous trouverez dans

    Original URL path: http://www.diploweb.com/Geopolitique-La-Russie-de-Vladimir.html (2016-02-08)
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  • Whither Gazprom ? The EU and Russia’s gas - Russie
    sound is almost certainly unrealistic And it is not at all obvious that these two objectives will not prove mutually contradictory II GASOCRACY IN RUSSIA It now seems a common assumption that as Russia s share in the EU s gas supply grows so will its ability to influence or maybe dictate European policy the implication being that blackmail or linkage might become part of Russia s dealings with the EU The fate of Georgia apparently frozen out because of its vocal opposition to Russian policy appears to lurk in many peoples mind But the EU is not Georgia and there is scant evidence that Russia ever considered using its gas exports to the EU as a weapon Indeed not even at the height of the Cold War when Russia was still part of the Soviet Union were these exports ever threatened There is a simple reason for that As dependent as the EU may be on gas imports Russia is even more dependent on gas exports About 90 of Russia s total natural gas exports are delivered to European countries When adding oil exports and other raw materials Russia s energy exports to the EU account for roughly 75 of Russia s export earnings and 40 of Russia s budget receipts 3 Those numbers are reinforced by the sheer value of the European markets which boast retail prices at least three times as high as Russia s domestic prices despite the latter s sharp increase in recent years More critical still is the fact that outside the former Soviet Union Russia currently has no credible alternative customer to Europe The current pipeline network is directed solely towards Europe Russia currently lacks both large scale LNG equipments which would allow it to trade with North America and eastward bound pipelines which would allow it to serve the booming Chinese market Given the size and cost of these new infrastructures Russia will almost certainly have no choice but to sell its gas to Europe for at least another decade and probably significantly longer than that 4 Russian authorities are well aware that they cannot afford to threaten their energy trade with Europe 5 But self interest is not the sole determinant of Russia s reliability and there are perfectly valid reasons for the Europeans to worry about the safety of their supplies These reasons are to be found in the state of Russia s gas sector Four major evolutions have shaped Russia s gas industry in the last few years Outdated capacities The obsolescence which characterises Russia s gas sector applies to both production and transport Ever since Soviet times Russian gas production has been relying on three large gas condensate fields at Urengoy Yamburg and Medvezhe in North Western Siberia Those three fields are now being rapidly depleted and are within sight of the end of their productive lives While the opening up of the supergiant Zapolyarnoye field in the early 2000s was able for a time to conceal that decline that latest field has now reached its peak as well In order to prevent a slump in production nearby satellite fields have recently been put into operation but that potential will also quickly be exhausted On current resources therefore Russia has now entered a sustained period of production decline by 2020 it will need to replace around 200 Bcm of production capacity which will not be achievable unless entire new gas fields are opened up for exploitation The sums involved however are huge The most promising fields for any sustained increase of Russia s gas production the Yamal Peninsula deposits which alone account for more than 10 of all proven gas reserves would require capital investments in the order of 20 25bn for the first phase of development alone The total sum would be much higher than that so far a clear strategy for developing the Yamal Peninsula has yet to be established 6 In the meantime well over 20 of high pressure transmission lines are beyond their design lifetime of 30 years while nearly 60 of the network is over 20 years old The resulting degradation of the pipeline network has two consequences One is massive waste due to pipeline leakage and gas flaring that latest factor is reckoned by the IEA to amount to nearly 60 Bcm year 7 The other is rapid congestion of the entire network which cannot cope with the growing demand traffic on some parts of the network is now above 90 of the infrastructure s transportation capacity So in addition to replacing production capacity massive investments are also needed to start the wholesale refurbishment of the Unified Gas Supply System UGSS A shortage of domestic investment It is commonly agreed that actual investments have not been anywhere near those needs so far There have been two explanations for that One is the unreliability of the regulatory fiscal and political framework within which companies have to operate In spite of half hearted attempts at establishing a lasting settlement the laws governing the Russian gas sector remain uncertain and their implementation sometimes arbitrary This lack of stability has been compounded both by the stalling of the reform process and by the Kremlin s increasingly brazen interference often of an informal nature in the gas sector The second reason has to do with the peculiarities of the most important actor of all Russia s state owned company Gazprom The nature of the company itself and the quality of its decision making process are the subject of considerable disagreement among experts 8 However several facts stand out First Gazprom accounts for more than 85 of Russian gas production and other gas producing companies often have no choice but to use Gazprom s pipeline network to bring their production to the market 9 Second Gazprom is now by law the single export channel to Europe meaning that European consumers cannot benefit from any remaining competition within Russia 10 Third the Russian State openly favours Gazprom and seldom hesitates to use its regulatory powers to ensure a favourable outcome whenever a commercial dispute arises between Gazprom and any of its fellow competitors Finally both the nature of Gazprom s spending and the level of its strategic investments over the past few years have been inconsistent with the maintenance of long term production capacity Gazprom s accrued investments in gas field development over the past seven years amount to a mere 12 5bn in current prices In the meantime in the past three years alone and after more or less sustainable windfall exports revenues Gazprom has spent nearly 18bn on the acquisition of shares in companies operating outside the gas sector 11 The company has also been busy buying off its domestic competitors while prioritizing pipeline construction mainly export pipelines and the purchase of assets in oil power and petrochemistry industries In other words Gazprom has devoted most of its resources to consolidating its near monopoly and expanding its activities while apparently neglecting the actual requirements of its core business Whether these decisions stem from rational economic behaviour or the self serving needs of company insiders the consequences in terms of long term production capacity are clear and disquieting A principled hostility towards foreign investment One obvious way to compensate for the lack of domestic investments would be for Russia to welcome foreign investments in gas production and transportation That the Russian authorities have determinedly rejected this policy option is not necessarily surprising the experience of the 90s has essentially discredited Western economic prescriptions among Russians of all stripes while retaining sole ownership of the country s strategic resources may seem a natural way for the State to enhance its own sovereignty and project its power abroad In any case energy nationalism is hardly a Russian preserve Russia however has been both capricious in enforcing its sovereign rights and improvident in coming up with a viable alternative Russia s current policy towards foreign owned companies has two distinct features One is the willingness to use the State s supposedly neutral regulatory institutions as a weapon to expropriate targeted companies usually in favour of Gazprom 12 The other is a principled opposition to international legal standards regulating the energy sector Russia has thus far refused to ratify the Washington Convention of 1965 which establishes international legal mechanisms for foreign investors to resolve investment disputes The European Energy Charter which would guarantee the safety of European investments in Russia s gas sector is rejected for similar reasons That particular feature of Russian policy is unlikely to change any time soon Another notable element of Russia s energy policy include the secrecy surrounding reserve data which is deemed a State secret and remains inaccessible to all but a few insiders Russia s increasingly fraught relations with its near abroad In the days of the Soviet Union Russian gas was distributed at heavily discounted prices to all Soviet republics Today these arrangements would amount to a huge Russian subsidy freely granted to what are now fully independent countries Russia s willingness to end this preferential treatment and sell its gas at market prices is therefore understandable However this issue has been mixed up with the general mistrust characterising Russia s relations with its immediate neighbours with many describing Russia s policy towards them as neo imperialist This difficulty has been exacerbated by the lack of openness surrounding the decision making process both in the Kremlin and at Gazprom and the resulting brusqueness with which decisions are being handed down and enforced As a result what might have been normal commercial disputes have twice in recent times escalated in full blown diplomatic rows leading to an interruption of energy flows through Ukraine in 2006 and Belarus in 2007 Though the consequences for European customers have been benign there is no guarantee that such crises will not recur possibly in much more virulent form Whether the combination of these four factors will indeed result in a full fledged gas shortage and the effective disruption of the EU s gas supplies in the next few years is hard to ascertain 13 Many contingencies will determine the outcome the future level of Russia s domestic consumption 14 Gazprom s ability to rapidly develop smaller fields notably offshore fields in the Ob and Taz Bays which are close to the existing pipeline network and are reportedly worth around 80 Bcm year potential deliveries from Russia s other gas producers the level of imports from Central Asian countries chiefly Turkmenistan but also Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 15 Nevertheless it is now clear that maintaining Russia s current production and transportation capacities never mind increasing them will almost certainly require massive commitments both financial and technical in the years to come and that Russia s willingness or ability to single handedly incur such massive investments is far from obvious Yet while this would seem to validate the EU s current negotiating strategy notably its repeated attempts to have Russia ratify the European Energy Charter the final fact to bear in mind is that Russia s current opposition to foreign investments in its gas sector is probably nonnegotiable The current policy stems not just from a strategic posture but covers a complicated array of power and business relations going all the way to the top of the Russian state Gazprom s current CEO Alexei Miller is a protégé of President Vladimir Putin while Dmitri Medvedev a deputy Prime Minister and one of President Putin s likeliest potential successors in 2008 serves as the company s board chairman Gas policy in Russia is not a purely commercial endeavour nor even simply a strategic policy but a component part of the State apparatus Asking Russia s leaders to significantly alter this policy amounts to asking them to saw off the branch on which they sit It is simply asking too much III UNBUNDLING RUSSIA AND GAS Whatever amount of gas Russia has to sell the EU will continue to buy that much is certain Beyond this a hole is developing where the EU s hard headed reappraisal of its dependence on Russian gas imports should stand The bottom line is that the EU might indeed face a major gas shortage in the next few years that there is very little it can do against that and that it has scarcely begun to prepare for this ghastly but realistic possibility Indeed for all their well publicised anxiety Europeans by and large continue to take the availability of Russian gas for granted Such levity is worsened by the fact that energy has remained a mostly national policy so far with governments and national champions especially in the West busy striking their particular deals with Gazprom without any mechanisms to ensure European solidarity in the event of a crisis This has two consequences One is to forfeit the increased leverage which a united EU might summon in its dealings with Gazprom a leverage which might bring sizable commercial benefits The other is the risk of an enormously damaging rift between EU members should Russia decide or be forced to prioritise one set of European customers over another say to continue its deliveries to West European countries while bypassing the new Member States The new North European pipeline once completed would provide Russia with the requisite tool to this end 16 The recent Commission proposals should not be ditched most of them indeed should be implemented as a matter of urgency But complementary measures need to be imagined in order to prepare the EU for a possible gas drought The Commission s proposal to set up strategic gas reserves should be made the first order of business more ambitiously but equally importantly an EU wide list of critical infrastructures should be drawn up whose gas supply should be prioritised in the event of a general shortage though whether this measure could actually be implemented in the absence of fully opened energy markets and interconnected networks is debatable On a more symbolic level the EU s energy solidarity needs to be reaffirmed Any hint of energy nationalism on the part of notably Western EU members risks undermining the new members faith in European solidarity and support and confirming their destructive suspicion that the West would not flinch from dealing with Russia at their own expense provided their interests are safeguarded More generally the particular issue of gas imports inevitably brings the EU back to the more general topic of its overall relations with Russia Yet just as energy should be understood as a fully autonomous policy realm it is vitally important to remember that relations with Russia go well beyond energy matters Indeed so important are the stakes here that a general reappraisal of the EU Russia partnership is required one that would sharply de emphasize the importance of energy and focus on the more substantial and ultimately more momentous general positioning of Russia and the EU on the world stage This return to basic foreign policy principles may or may not impact the EU Russia energy relationship but the reverse must not be allowed to become true However important energy policy may be and it is important it must not be allowed to dominate the bilateral and multilateral agenda especially since such emphasis has borne so little fruit so far There is no space here to analyse in depth the various general elements of the EU Russia Partnership and their complicated interaction With regard to energy however three facts need to be underlined The EU s goal of gradually exporting the European political and economic model in Russia with the commendable aim of creating a fully integrated Euro Russian legal and economic community has failed Failure may or may not have been preordained with a deeply imbalanced economy a weak and fledgling public sphere 17 pitted against strong and assertive security services deeply ingrained habits of secretiveness unaccountability and administrative command and a recent history of traumatic upheavals Russia was perhaps an unlikely candidate for a peaceful transition to social democracy a fact compounded by well meaning but misguided Western meddling in the 1990s 18 and resurgent Russian nationalism in the 2000s 19 For now moderate despotism probably remains Russia s best realistic possibility And while it is assuredly too soon to judge Vladimir Putin s presidency it is certainly possible to argue that he might have been much worse In particular macroeconomic and fiscal policies have remained prudent and successful the authorities have largely resisted the temptations of the oil and gas boom and there has been no unsustainable spending spree so far 20 This achievement remains obviously vulnerable to any change in Russia s political circumstances but however this and other issues play out in the context of the 2008 presidential election the one certainty is that the EU s ability to influence Russia s core domestic policies including its energy policy will remain extremely limited Any realistic new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement will have to take this fact into account The most contentious bilateral issue is neither Russia s illiberal features nor the uncertainty surrounding its energy policies both of which are essentially domestic matters but the fate of the near abroad Ukraine Belarus Moldova and Georgia have not just become pawns in a potentially destructive game of EU Russian geopolitical rivalry they have also become a bone of contention within the EU itself with new members accusing old members of selling out these countries interests for the sake of peaceful relations with Russia In the long run this disagreement is probably the single biggest obstacle to any effective common European foreign policy including a common external energy policy Forging a compromise policy regarding the former European Soviet republics is therefore a prerequisite first between the EU s Western and Eastern members then between the EU and Russia Elements of such a compromise might include reaffirming these countries de jure territorial integrity while allowing considerable tolerance towards contrarian facts on the ground and agreeing on

    Original URL path: http://www.diploweb.com/Whither-Gazprom-The-EU-and-Russia.html (2016-02-08)
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  • Politiques Sciences Po Publications Oakeshott le scepticisme en politique éd Michalon 2004 numerous articles on EU foreign policy matters Ses articles pour Diploweb com Whither Gazprom The EU and Russia s gas EU Russia cooperation on the world stage will have implications for energy policy No matter what the EU may desire energy relations will never Direction Directeur P Verluise Conseil scientifique Charte du site Faire un don Devenir membre

    Original URL path: http://www.diploweb.com/_Quentin-PERRET_.html (2016-02-08)
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  • "La Russie", A. Ciattoni (dir.) - Russie
    l autre superpuissance les États Unis leader du monde libéral Le chemin a donc été difficile pour ce pays inscrit dans de nouvelles frontières et en quête de retrouver un rang de grande puissance perdu La Russie a traversé à la suite de la chute du régime soviétique en 1991 une grave crise politique démographique économique et sociale Le passage d une économie planifiée fonctionnant en complémentarité avec l ensemble des Républiques constituant la Fédération et avec les pays d Europe de l Est à une économie libérale ouverte concurrentielle ne s est pas fait sans heurts sans excès De même l apprentissage de la démocratie s est accompagné de difficultés politiques Le pouvoir central à partir de 1998 a peu à peu repris la main après une période d affaiblissement La Russie est maintenant engagée dans une voie nouvelle avec d importants atouts dont l immense potentiel de ressources de son territoire et son retour sur la scène internationale est réel Les fabuleuses richesses en pétrole et gaz naturel sont les fondements de la géopolitique russe les moyens du retour sur la scène internationale Gazprom est un État dans l État Pour comprendre ce qu est la Russie de nos jours nous vous proposons une analyse en cinq chapitres Compte tenu des difficultés qu ont pu rencontrer et que rencontrent les hommes pour maîtriser leur territoire et les inflexions en cours dans l organisation spatiale de la Russie un premier chapitre présente les caractères du milieu autour des thèmes de l immensité et du froid Y Veyret A Ciattoni La Russie A Ciattoni dir Sedes 2007 Pour préparer le CAPES et l Agrégation de géographie Le deuxième thème présente le peuplement et les villes de Russie P Thorez Les différentes crises ont en effet affecté la répartition de la

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  • contributions de C Bayou P Marchand Y Richard P Thorez P Verluise Y Veyret Ses articles pour Diploweb com La Russie A Ciattoni dir Paris Sedes octobre 2007 Avec des contributions de C Bayou P Marchand Y Richard P Thorez P Verluise Y Veyret À la suite de Direction Directeur P Verluise Conseil scientifique Charte du site Faire un don Devenir membre Auteurs Proposer un article Synergies Présenter le site

    Original URL path: http://www.diploweb.com/_Annette-CIATTONI_.html (2016-02-08)
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  • "KGB Connexion. Le système Poutine", par H. Blanc - Russie
    quelque temps déjà le nouvel homme fort est Boris Eltsine Après avoir joué un rôle déterminant dans l implosion du système soviétique le 8 décembre 1991 soit trois jours après l artificielle suspension de paiement de la dette extérieure soviétique Boris Eltsine met en œuvre un série de privatisations qui éblouissent les Occidentaux Sous couvert de passage à l économie de marché les néo nomenklaturistes et les mafias accaparent le bien public avec la bénédiction des services secrets La Russie devient un Etat oligarchique au capitalisme mafieux Les années Eltsine 1991 1999 sont celles de La Russie oligarchique titre du deuxième chapitre 80 de la population est rejetée sans ménagement en dessous du seuil de pauvreté tandis que l essentiel des richesses de cet immense pays se trouve détenu par 2 à 7 de la population Entre ces deux nouvelles catégories sociales s installe un parasite occulte qui prospère grâce au capitalisme sauvage le racket devient en effet une industrie très florissante p 71 Le nombre de chefs d entreprise et de banquiers froidement abattus devient également impressionnant ce qui consolide l emprise des mafias sur la sphère productive puisqu elles vendent une protection Quelques années après l effondrement de l URSS les différents clans maffieux hérités du soviétisme contrôlent 50 à 80 de l économie selon les estimations Insidieusement la Russie se mue en Etat oligarchique au capitalisme mafieux L idée même de démocratie s en trouve totalement discréditée dans l opinion Et ce à long terme p 92 Pendant ce temps une cellule de relations publiques relayée par les réseaux implantés à l Ouest présente le KGB comme affaibli pour mieux faire accroire qu il ne représente plus aucune menace ni pour la Russie ni pour l Occident Celui ci baisse la garde avec un soulagement évident Pourtant l ex KGB gouverne secrètement le pays Par l entremise d Alexandre Korjakov par exemple confident et garde du corps de B Eltsine qui le suit comme son ombre ou de son fidèle ami Mikhaïl Barsoukov incidemment patron des services secrets p 85 Les relations entre les services secrets et les mafias russes Comment comprendre les relations entre les services secrets et les mafias russes Un esprit mal informé a tendance à penser qu il s agit par nature de structures ennemies les services combattant par définition les mafias Les experts occidentaux voient pourtant la situation autrement L auteur cite à ce propos B Schmidbauer secrétaire d Etat chargé de coordonner les services de renseignements allemands Nous avons la certitude que des membres de l ancien KGB jouent aujourd hui 1994 un rôle important dans le secteur du crime organisé que les structures du KGB participent activement aux trafics de drogues d armes de matières nucléaires de traite des Blanches et fabriquent de la fausse monnaie p 86 En outre les officiers des services spéciaux se présentent par milliers aux élections régionales et fédérales russes Bien documentés ils remportent souvent le siège escompté et gagnent ainsi une onction démocratique du

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  • Russie: quel système de pouvoir ? Réponse - Russie
    parlement local une dérogation pour un troisième mandat Il y a eu trois à six semaines d arguties initiées par le Procureur général Certains tribunaux au niveau fédéral ont statué à l illégalité de la décision Evidemment les tribunaux régionaux ont validé la procédure en faveur du cacique local Après six semaines le Président Nikolaïev a décidé de se retirer La passation de pouvoir s est faite assez rapidement puisque le candidat favori était le nouveau patron d Alrossa Il est depuis devenu gouverneur avec le soutien du Kremlin Le Kremlin a récupéré 5 du capital d Alrossa On a l impression que la politique de quota des diamants et la manière dont l entreprise Alrossa paie ses impôts sont plus conformes à la loi Il y aurait donc eu à la fois un accord à l amiable entre les parties et une reprise en main du centre sur la périphérie Les termes de l échange étant Vous nous versez les ressources fiscales que vous devez à l Etat et nous vous laissons exploiter ces ressources naturelles A qui le tour Toutes les régions vont peu à peu passer sous les fourches du Kremlin Ce sera bientôt le tour de Saint Pétersbourg et de Moscou Le maire de Saint Pétersbourg Yakovlev est encore sous la critique du Kremlin De manière concomitante un certain nombre d affaires qui le concerne sont remontées à la surface Affaires qui sont générées par la Procurature donc par le Parquet une instance sécuritaire très politique Comme par hasard ces affaires remontent juste avant la prochaine élection du gouverneur de Saint Pétersbourg fin 2003 ou début 2004 Autant de moyens pour le moment venu inviter Yakovlev à se retirer des affaires en échange de quoi la Procurature veut bien faire le deuil d actes de corruption établis Le prochain gouverneur de Saint Pétersbourg sera probablement quelqu un plus en ligne avec le Kremlin Le deuxième Maire gouverneur en ligne de mire est le maire de Moscou Loujkov Le Kremlin tentera très probablement de récupérer le maire gouverneur de la capitale Ne serait ce que parce qu il possède un budget considérable ce qui induit de très gros enjeux L espoir d une immunité juridique suscite des vocations politiques Ces placements d hommes proches sont importants Il faut noter qu un certain nombre de gouverneurs récemment élus sont issus des grands groupes déjà mentionnés C est le cas d Abrahamovitch en Choukotka la région peuplée d esquimaux située à proximité du détroit de Béring Il vient du groupe Sibneft un groupe pétrolier Comme par hasard Choukotka est une région pétrolière A 36 ans il dispose d une fortune personnelle estimée à 3 milliards de dollars ce qui l a aidé pendant sa campagne électorale Il faut savoir que l élection au poste de gouverneur donne une immunité juridique Immunité qui fait rêver bien des magnats à qui l on pourrait peut être reprocher quelque chose En Yakoutie l ancien patron d Alrossa est devenu le président gouverneur

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  • Livres géopolitiques Transversaux Compil Diploweb Audiovisuel Audio Photo Vidéo Accueil MASSADA NB Extrait de la charte du site N ayant rien à cacher www diploweb com prend soin de joindre une notice biographique détaillée à chaque article Seule exception à cette règle quand la sécurité de l auteur l empêche de signer L éditeur du site assume alors la garantie de la compétence de l auteur auprès des internautes Ses articles pour Diploweb com Le système du pouvoir en Russie A l aide d exemples l auteur met à jour les relations entre le Kremlin et la périphérie Les affaires judiciaires sont parfois utilisées pour Les dessous de l aide technique occidentale à la Russie Comment l aide technique des pays occidentaux à la Russie profite t elle aussi à des réseaux situés dans les pays contributeurs Cette étude inédite Direction Directeur P Verluise Conseil scientifique Charte du site Faire un don Devenir membre Auteurs Proposer un article Synergies Présenter le site Conférences Partenaires Participer Proposer une synergie Liens conseillés Archives Retrouvez la chaîne Diploweb sur Union européenne États membres Institutions Pays candidats Russie CEI Russie CEI Amérique Amérique du Nord Amérique centrale Amérique du Sud Asie Chine Inde Zone

    Original URL path: http://www.diploweb.com/_MASSADA_.html (2016-02-08)
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