archive-com.com » COM » O » OPTIMALMATCHING.COM

Total: 17

Choose link from "Titles, links and description words view":

Or switch to "Titles and links view".
  • Algorithms and Complexity Research at Glasgow
    Theory and Algorithms research group People Current and recent Glasgow Algorithms and Complexity people together with their research interests Projects Current and recent Glasgow Algorithms and Complexity research projects Collaboration Information about practical collaboration that we are involved in that incorporate our matching algorithms Publications Information about Glasgow Algorithms and Complexity publications and technical reports Resources Some links relating to research in Algorithms and Complexity Applications Information about applications of

    Original URL path: http://www.optimalmatching.com/ (2016-02-16)
    Open archived version from archive


  • MATCH UP 2015
    choice etc two sided matchings involving agents and items e g house allocation course allocation project allocation assigning papers to reviewers school choice etc one sided matchings roommates problem kidney exchanges etc matching with payments assignment game etc Invited speakers Katarína Cechlárová Pavol Jozef Šafárik University in Košice Slovakia Assignment of teachers to schools a new variation on an old theme Several countries more or less successfully use centralized matching schemes for assigning teachers to vacant positions at schools We explore combinatorial and computational aspects of a possible similar scheme motivated by the situation characteristic for Slovak and Czech education system where each teacher specializes in two subjects We present a model that takes into consideration that schools may have different capacities for each subject and show that its combinatorial structure leads to intractable problems even under several strong restrictions concerning the total number of subjects partial capacities of schools and the number of acceptable schools each teacher is allowed to list We propose several approximation algorithms Finally we present integer programming models and their application to real data Christine Cheng University of Wisconsin Milwaukee USA Fair Stable Matchings It has long been known that Gale and Shapley s deferred acceptance algorithm outputs stable matchings that are highly biased towards one side of the matching This has motivated the study of fair stable matchings In the first part of the talk we will discuss the class of globally fair stable matchings Their fairness is derived from the fact that they are good representatives of the set of stable matchings We will also describe how our results extend to other objects that form a distributive lattice In the second part of the talk we will consider the Random Order Mechanism ROM an iterative version of the deferred acceptance algorithm When the ordering of the agents is chosen uniformly at random one can argue that the process ROM uses for arriving at a stable matching is procedurally fair We shall present various computational results with regards to the stable matchings that ROM can output Hervé Moulin University of Glasgow UK One dimensional mechanism design When agents allocations are one dimensional and preferences are convex the three perennial goals of mechanism design efficiency prior free incentive compatibility and fairness horizontal equity are compatible This has been known for decades in the cases of voting and of division of a non disposable commodity We show that it is in fact true when the range of allocation profiles is an arbitrary convex and compact set Examples include load balancing with arbitrary flow graph constraints coordinating joint work inside a team or across teams when individual contributions are substitutable or complementary and any joint venture with a convex technology where each agent provides a single input or consumes a single output The set of efficient incentive compatible and fair mechanisms is very rich and additional requirements such as consistency are needed to identify reasonable candidates Submissions We call for three types of contributions Format A contributed

    Original URL path: http://www.optimalmatching.com/MATCHUP2015/ (2016-02-16)
    Open archived version from archive

  • MATCH UP 2015
    Azevedo Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania USA Péter Bir oacute Hungarian Academy of Sciences Hungary co chair Estelle Cantillon Université Libre de Bruxelles Belgium Brian Dean Clemson University USA Federico Echenique California Institute of Technology USA Lars Ehlers University of Montréal Canada Tamás Fleiner Budapest University of Technology and Economics Hungary Chien Chung Huang Chalmers University of Technology Sweden Nicole Immorlica Microsoft Research USA Yuichiro Kamada University of

    Original URL path: http://www.optimalmatching.com/MATCHUP2015/committees.html (2016-02-16)
    Open archived version from archive

  • MATCH UP 2015
    workshop capacity permitting but in order for abstracts to appear in the workshop proceedings they must be received by Monday 2 March Instructions for submitting poster abstracts Authors interested in contributing to the poster session should prepare a PDF file containing the title abstract and author details corresponding to the poster There is no specified style file We only ask that your submission is at most 1 page long formatted for A4 paper in 11 point font or larger with at least 1 inch margins all around and crucially having NO page numbering This page should include the title of the paper the list of authors their affiliations and addresses and email addresses if appropriate the poster abstract with any relevant acknowledgements added as a footnote Authors should upload their PDF file to EasyChair by clicking on the submission link below Ensure that your abstract is uploaded as a Format B submission Submission link Contributed papers Previously we called for two types of contributed papers Format A original contribution not previously published in or accepted by another conference proceedings or journal not under review for a conference or journal elsewhere at most 12 pages including bibliography using 11 point font or larger with at least 1 margins all round and in single column format Any material beyond this limit should be placed in a clearly marked appendix which will be read at the discretion of the programme committee accepted papers will be published in proceedings however this should not prevent the simultaneous or subsequent submission of contributed papers to other workshops conferences or journals Format B not necessarily original work can have been published already in or accepted by another conference proceedings or journal can be under review for a conference or journal elsewhere no page limit only the abstract

    Original URL path: http://www.optimalmatching.com/MATCHUP2015/submissions.html (2016-02-16)
    Open archived version from archive

  • MATCH UP 2015
    14 30 14 50 Brian Dean and Rommel Jalasutram Factor Revealing LPs and Stable Matching with Ties and Incomplete Lists 14 50 15 10 Ágnes Cseh and Brian Dean Improved Algorithmic Results for Unsplittable Stable Allocation Problems 15 10 15 30 Danny Munera Daniel Diaz Salvador Abreu Francesca Rossi Vijay Saraswat and Philippe Codognet A Local Search Algorithm for SMTI and its extension to HRT Problems 15 30 15 50 Rafail Ostrovsky and Will Rosenbaum It s Not Easy Being Three The Approximability of Three Dimensional Stable Matching Problems 15 50 16 10 Péter Biró Elena Iñarra and Elena Molis A new solution for the roommate problem The Q stable matchings 16 10 16 40 Coffee break Room 305 Gilbert Scott building 16 40 18 00 Contributed talks Contracts chair Tamás Fleiner 16 40 17 00 Alexander Teytelboym Trading networks with bilateral contracts 17 00 17 20 John Hatfield Scott Kominers and Alexander Westkamp Strategy Proofness and Stability for Matching with Contracts 17 20 17 40 Jan Christoph Schlegel Contracts versus Salaries in Matching A General Result 17 40 18 00 John Hatfield Scott Kominers Alexandru Nichifor Michael Ostrovsky and Alexander Westkamp Full Substitutability in Trading Networks 18 00 19 30 Poster session Room 305 Gilbert Scott Building drinks and canapés provided The following posters will be presented Haris Aziz Hans Georg Seedig and Jana Karina von Wedel On the Susceptibility of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm Steven J Brams D Marc Kilgour Christian Klamler Maximin Envy Free Division of Indivisible Items Anastasia Damamme Aurélie Beynier Yann Chevaleyre and Nicolas Maudet Dynamics of Swaps in House Markets Brian Dean Christopher Gropp and Rommel Jalasutram A Continuum of Stable Matching Relaxation Joanna Drummond and Craig Boutilier Preference Elicitation Approximate Stability and Interview Minimization in Stable Matchings Pavlos Eirinakis Dimitrios Magos and Ioannis Mourtos Linear and Integer Programming formulations for Stable Allocations and House Allocations Bora Evci A Simple Mechanism for the Roommate Problem Sambuddha Ghosh Yan Long and Manipushpak Mitra Dynamic VCG Mechanisms in Queuing Sujit Gujar and Boi Faltings Dynamic Task Assignments An Online Two Sided Matching Approach Eliana Quintilii Redesigning the Entry Level of the Italian Academic Job Market a Two Sided Matching with the Agency Problem Matthew Weldon and Andrew Titman Estimation of two sided choice models an application to public school choice Friday 17 April 2015 Thursday Saturday 09 00 10 00 MATCH UP 2015 invited speaker chair Rob Irving Christine Cheng University of Wisconsin Milwaukee USA Fair Stable Matchings It has long been known that Gale and Shapley s deferred acceptance algorithm outputs stable matchings that are highly biased towards one side of the matching This has motivated the study of fair stable matchings In the first part of the talk we will discuss the class of globally fair stable matchings Their fairness is derived from the fact that they are good representatives of the set of stable matchings We will also describe how our results extend to other objects that form a distributive lattice In the

    Original URL path: http://www.optimalmatching.com/MATCHUP2015/program.html (2016-02-16)
    Open archived version from archive

  • MATCH UP 2015
    Late from 13 March until 8 April 325 Student fee Regular available until 12 March 200 Student fee Late from 13 March until 8 April 250 Registration is now closed Please email matchup2015 dcs gla ac uk with any questions Funding There are a limited number of assisted places funded by SICSA that will be awarded to PhD students studying Computer Science at SICSA universities These assisted places will cover

    Original URL path: http://www.optimalmatching.com/MATCHUP2015/registration.html (2016-02-16)
    Open archived version from archive

  • MATCH UP 2015
    Hotel 4 ranked 46 of 89 hotels 1 9 Grosvenor Terrace Great Western Road Glasgow G12 0TA Reviews on Tripadvisor Closest to University about 7 minutes walking distance from the workshop venue Kelvingrove Hotel 3 ranked 47 of 89 hotels 944 Sauchiehall Street Glasgow G3 7TH Reviews on Tripadvisor About 15 minutes walking distance from the workshop venue Kelvin Hotel 2 ranked 53 of 89 hotels 15 Buckingham Terrace Great Western Road Glasgow G12 8EB Second closest to University about 8 minutes walking distance from the workshop venue Reviews on Tripadvisor West End B Bs 15 Glasgow ranked 2 of 36 B B 15 Woodside Place Glasgow G3 7QL About 20 minutes walking distance from the workshop venue Reviews on Tripadvisor Alamo Guest House ranked 3 of 36 B B 46 Gray Street Kelvingrove Park Glasgow G3 7SE About 15 minutes walking distance from the workshop venue Reviews on Tripadvisor The Flower House ranked 10 of 36 B B 33 St Vincent Crescent Glasgow G3 8NG About 20 minutes walking distance from the workshop venue Reviews on Tripadvisor Amadeus Guest house ranked 13 of 36 B B 411 North Woodside Road Glasgow G20 6NN About 15 minutes walking distance from the workshop venue Reviews on Tripadvisor City Centre hotels Premier Inn Glasgow City Centre Buchanan Galleries 3 ranked 2 of 89 hotels 141 West Nile Street St Andrew House Glasgow G1 2RN Close to Buchanan Street subway Reviews on TripAdvisor CitizenM Glasgow 4 ranked 8 of 89 hotels 60 Renfrew Street corner of Hope Street Glasgow G2 3BW Reviews on Tripadvisor Premier Inn Glasgow City Centre George Square 3 ranked 16 of 89 hotels 187 George Street Glasgow G1 1YU Close to Buchanan Street subway Reviews on Tripadvisor Grand Central Hotel 4 ranked 25 of 89 hotels 99 Gordon Street Glasgow G1 3SF Reviews on Tripadvisor Jurys Inn Glasgow 4 ranked 31 of 89 hotels 80 Jamaica Street Glasgow G1 4QG Reviews on Tripadvisor Holiday Inn Express Glasgow City Centre Theatreland 3 ranked 36 of 89 hotels 165 West Nile Street Glasgow G1 2RL Reviews on Tripadvisor Ibis Glasgow City Centre 2 ranked 46 of 89 hotels 220 West Regent Street Glasgow G2 4DQ Reviews on Tripadvisor City Centre B Bs Adelaides ranked 8 of 36 B B 209 Bath Street Glasgow G2 4HZ Reviews on Tripadvisor Map of the City Center Restaurants and Cafés Registration covers lunches and coffee breaks during the workshop as well as the workshop dinner on Friday 17 April For the few meals that are not provided or if you are planning to stay beyond the dates of the workshop we have listed some places here that we like to dine in or grab a bite at near the University in the West End and in the City Centre West End There are numerous restaurants pubs bars and cafés in the West End and near the University particularly on Byres Road Ashton lane and Great Western Road Here we have listed a few of our

    Original URL path: http://www.optimalmatching.com/MATCHUP2015/practical.html (2016-02-16)
    Open archived version from archive

  • MATCH UP 2015
    Zhang Social Welfare in One sided Matchings Random Priority and Beyond Haris Aziz Serge Gaspers Simon Mackenzie Nicholas Mattei Nina Narodytska and Toby Walsh Manipulating the Probabilistic Serial Rule Ata Atay Francesc Llerena and Marina Nunez Generalized three sided assignment markets consistency and the core Alexander Nesterov Fairness and Efficiency in a Random Assignment Three Impossibility Results Anna Bogomolnaia The most ordinally egalitarian of random voting rules Pavlos Eirinakis Dimitrios Magos and Ioannis Mourtos Polyhedral aspects of stable b matching Battal Dogan and Kemal Yildiz A New Efficiency Criterion for Probabilistic Assignments Inacio Bo and Orhan Aygun College Admission with Multidimensional Privileges The Brazilian Affirmative Action Case Yash Kanoria Daniela Saban and Jay Sethuraman The size of the core in assignment markets Brian Dean and Rommel Jalasutram Factor Revealing LPs and Stable Matching with Ties and Incomplete Lists Haris Aziz Toby Walsh and Lirong Xia Possible and Necessary Allocations via Sequential Mechanisms Ágnes Cseh and Brian Dean Improved Algorithmic Results for Unsplittable Stable Allocation Problems Jan Christoph Schlegel Contracts versus Salaries in Matching A General Result Naoyuki Kamiyama Matroid Generalizations of the Popular Matching and Condensation Problems with Strict Preferences Mustafa Afacan Zeynel Aliogullari and Mehmet Barlo Sticky Matching in School Choice Rafail Ostrovsky and Will Rosenbaum It s Not Easy Being Three The Approximability of Three Dimensional Stable Matching Problems Mizuki Hirakawa Yukiko Yamauchi Shuji Kijima and Masafumi Yamashita On The Structure of Popular Matchings in The Stable Marriage Problem Who Can Join a Popular Matching Kristiaan Glorie Margarida Carvalho Miguel Constantino Paul Bouman and Ana Viana Robust models for the Kidney Exchange Problem David Cantala and Juan Pereyra Driven by priorities manipulations under the Boston mechanism Alexander Teytelboym Trading networks with bilateral contracts Danny Munera Daniel Diaz Salvador Abreu Francesca Rossi Vijay Saraswat and Philippe Codognet A Local

    Original URL path: http://www.optimalmatching.com/MATCHUP2015/accepted.html (2016-02-16)
    Open archived version from archive



  •