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  • MATCH UP 2015
    post efficiency and envy freeness 2 ordinal efficiency and weak envy freeness and 3 ordinal efficiency and equal division lower bound Result 1 is the first impossibility result for this setting that uses ex post efficiency results 2 and 3 are more relevant for practical implementation than similar results in the literature In addition for N 3 the paper strengthens the characterization result by Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001 the random serial dictatorship mechanism is the unique strategy proof ex post efficient mechanism that eliminates strict envy between agents with the same preferences Anna Bogomolnaia The most ordinally egalitarian of random voting rules Abstract Aziz and Stursberg 1 propose an Egalitarian Simultaneous Reservation rule ESR a generalization of Serial rule one of the most discussed mechanisms in random assignment problem to the more general random social choice domain We provide an alternative definition or characterization of ESR as the unique most ordinally egalitarian one Specifically given a lottery p over alternatives for each agent i we define t p i k to be the total share in p of objects from her first k indifference classes ESR is shown to be the unique one which leximin maximizes the vector of all such shares t p i k i k Serial rule is known to be characterized by the same property see 2 Thus we provide an alternative way to show that ESR indeed coincides with Serial rule on the assignment domain Moreover since both rules are defined as the unique most ordinally egalitarian ones out result shows that ESR is the right way to think about generalizing Serial rule Pavlos Eirinakis Dimitrios Magos and Ioannis Mourtos Polyhedral aspects of stable b matching Abstract The theory of matroid kernels and their corresponding sets of blockers and antiblockers can be utilized to obtain a linear description of the stable b matching MM problem We revisit that description to derive the dimension of the stable b matching polytope P I Moreover we provide a minimal representation of P I by establishing its minimal equation system and identifying its facet defining inequalities This representation includes O m constraints m being the number of pairs hence being significantly smaller than the existing one and linear with respect to the size of the problem This minimal representation carries over to the stable admissions SA problem for which we also establish the facial correspondence of the linear representation based on matroid kernels to the one based on combs Battal Dogan and Kemal Yildiz A New Efficiency Criterion for Probabilistic Assignments Abstract For probabilistic assignment of objects when only ordinal preference information is available we propose the following efficiency criterion a probabilistic assignment dominates another assignment if whenever the latter assignment is utilitarian efficient at a utility profile consistent with the ordinal preferences the former assignment is utilitarian efficient too and there is a utility profile consistent with the ordinal preferences at which the latter assignment is not utilitarian efficient but the former assignment is utilitarian efficient We provide a simple characterization of probabilistic assignments which are not dominated in this sense In particular if preferences are strict the only undominated probabilistic assignments are the Pareto efficient deterministic assignments We revisit an extensively studied probabilistic assignment mechanism the Probabilistic Serial rule and show that it can be improved in efficiency without sacrificing fairness Inacio Bo and Orhan Aygun College Admission with Multidimensional Privileges The Brazilian Affirmative Action Case Abstract Abstract In August of 2012 the Brazilian federal government enacted a law mandating the implementation of affirmative action policies in public federal universities for candidates from racial minorities low income families and those coming from public high schools We show that by using the method proposed by the government the choices made by the colleges will not satisfy a general fairness condition and that moreover students who strategize over the privileges that they claim may improve their placement Data from university admissions in more than 3 000 programs in 2013 show that the conditions for those undesirable incentives are observed in more than 49 of them We propose a choice function for the colleges that removes any gain from strategizing over the privileges claimed is fair satisfies the substitutes condition and under reasonable assumptions on the type distribution of the population fully satisfies the diversity objectives expressed by the reserves We finalize by proposing a strategy proof mechanism that matches students and colleges with the use of the proposed choice function Yash Kanoria Daniela Saban and Jay Sethuraman The size of the core in assignment markets Abstract Assignment markets involve matching with transfers as in labor markets and housing markets We consider a two sided assignment market with agent types and stochastic structure similar to models used in empirical studies and characterize the size of the core in such markets Each agent has a randomly drawn productivity with respect to each type of agent on the other side The value generated from a match between a pair of agents is the sum of the two productivity terms each of which depends only on the type but not the identity of one of the agents and a third deterministic term driven by the pair of types We allow the number of agents to grow keeping the number of agent types fixed Let n be the number of agents and K be the number of types on the side of the market with more types We find under reasonable assumptions that the relative variation in utility per agent over core outcomes is bounded as O 1 n 1 K where polylogarithmic factors have been suppressed Further we show that this bound is tight in worst case We also provide a tighter bound under more restrictive assumptions Brian Dean and Rommel Jalasutram Factor Revealing LPs and Stable Matching with Ties and Incomplete Lists Abstract Stable matching with ties and incomplete lists SMTI is one of the most prominent NP hard problems in the domain of ordinal matching where we seek to find a bipartite matching between a set of men and a set of women that is stable with respect to their preferences When ties in preference lists are restricted to one side of the problem Iwama et al devised a variant of the famous Gale Shapley stable matching algorithm that breaks ties using edge weights from a linear programming LP relaxation of the problem leading to an approximation ratio of 25 17 1 4706 We apply ideas from factor revealing LPs to show via computational proof involving the solution of massive LPs that their analysis can be systematically improved to yield an approximation ratio of 19 13 1 4615 improving the best currently known ratio obtained via different techniques by Radnai of 41 28 1 4643 Haris Aziz Toby Walsh and Lirong Xia Possible and Necessary Allocations via Sequential Mechanisms Abstract A simple mechanism for allocating indivisible resources is sequential allocation in which agents take turns to pick items We focus on possible and necessary allocation problems checking whether allocations of a given form occur in some or all mechanisms for several commonly used classes of sequential allocation mechanisms In particular we consider whether a given agent receives a given item a set of items or a subset of items for five natural classes of sequential allocation mechanisms balanced recursively balanced balanced alternating strictly alternating and all policies We identify characterizations of allocations produced balanced recursively balanced balanced alternating policies and strictly altnernating respectively which extend the well known characterization by Brams and King 2005 for policies without restrictions In addition we examine the computational complexity of possible and necessary allocation problems for these classes Ágnes Cseh and Brian Dean Improved Algorithmic Results for Unsplittable Stable Allocation Problems Abstract The stable allocation problem is a many to many generalization of the well known stable marriage problem where we seek a bipartite assignment between say jobs of varying sizes and machines of varying capacities that is stable based on a set of underlying preference lists submitted by the jobs and machines Building on the initial work of Dean et al we study a natural unsplittable variant of this problem where each assigned job must be fully assigned to a single machine Such unsplittable bipartite assignment problems generally tend to be NP hard including previously proposed variants of the unsplittable stable allocation problem Our main result is to show that under an alternative model of stability the unsplittable stable allocation problem becomes solvable in polynomial time although this model is less likely to admit feasible solutions than the model proposed by McDermid and Manlove we show that in the event there is no feasible solution our approach computes a solution of minimal total congestion overfilling of all machines collectively beyond their capacities We also describe a technique for rounding the solution of a stable allocation problem to produce relaxed unsplit solutions that are only mildly infeasible where each machine is overcongested by at most a single job Jan Christoph Schlegel Contracts versus Salaries in Matching A General Result Abstract It is shown that a matching market with contracts may be embedded into a matching market with salaries under weaker conditions than substitutability of contracts In particular the result applies to the recently studied problem of cadet to branch matching As an application of the embedding result a new class of mechanisms for matching markets with contracts is defined that generalize the firm proposing deferred acceptance algorithm to the case where contracts are unilateral substitutes for firms Naoyuki Kamiyama Matroid Generalizations of the Popular Matching and Condensation Problems with Strict Preferences Abstract In this talk we first consider a matroid generalization of the popular matching problem without ties introduced by Abraham Irving Kavitha and Mehlhorn and give a polynomial time algorithm for this problem In the second half of this talk we consider the problem of transforming a given instance of the popular matching problem without ties by deleting a minimum number of applicants so that it has a popular matching under matroid constraints This problem is a matroid generalization of the popular condensation problem without ties proposed by Wu Lin Wang and Chao By using the results in the first half we give a polynomial time algorithm for this problem Mustafa Afacan Zeynel Aliogullari and Mehmet Barlo Sticky Matching in School Choice Abstract We analyze the school choice model and introduce costly appeals against violations of students priorities If these costs are sufficiently high then some of such appeals may not provide benefits to the parents even when their priorities are violated Instead of working with cardinal notions our construction elicits the relevant ordinal implications of these costs the information about the least rank decrease a student would be appealing against a priority violation his her stickiness degree from the students before the assignment is determined Then the notion of stability the main desiderata in school choice known to be at odds with efficiency is weakened by disregarding priority violations not worth the cost and the notion of sticky stability is obtained The first mechanism we introduce is efficiency improving deferred acceptance mechanism EIDA and we show that it is sticky stable and superior to the deferred acceptance mechanism DA in terms of efficiency and involves truthful revelations of the stickiness degrees The EIDA not maximally improving efficiency in the class of sticky stable solutions leads us to design efficiency corrected deferred acceptance mechanism ECDA which turns out to be both sticky stable and efficient within the class of sticky stable mechanisms While both mechanisms lack full incentive properties in the complete information case in certain incomplete information settings the former becomes immune to manipulations whereas the latter is still manipulable but with a diminished scope Rafail Ostrovsky and Will Rosenbaum It s Not Easy Being Three The Approximability of Three Dimensional Stable Matching Problems Abstract In 1976 Knuth asked if the stable marriage problem SMP can be generalized to marriages consisting of 3 genders In 1988 Alkan showed that the natural generalization of SMP to 3 genders 3GSM need not admit a stable marriage Three years later Ng and Hirschberg proved that it is NP complete to determine if given preferences admit a stable marriage They further prove an analogous result for the 3 person stable assignment 3PSA problem In light of Ng and Hirschberg s NP hardness result for 3GSM and 3PSA we initiate the study of approximate versions of these problems We describe two optimization variants of 3GSM and 3PSA maximally stable marriage matching MSM and maximum stable submarriage submatching MSS We show that both variants are NP hard to approximate within some fixed constant factor Conversely we describe a simple polynomial time algorithm which computes constant factor approximations for the maximally stable marriage and matching problems Thus of MSM is APX complete Mizuki Hirakawa Yukiko Yamauchi Shuji Kijima and Masafumi Yamashita On The Structure of Popular Matchings in The Stable Marriage Problem Who Can Join a Popular Matching Abstract Gale and Sotomayor 1985 gave a remark on the stable marriage problem that the set of people who are matched with themselves is the same for all stable matchings Motivated by a larger cardinality matching Huang and Kavitha 2013 investigated the structure of popular matchings an extended notion of stable matching Given an instance of the stable marriage problem a matching M is popular if there is no matching M such that more vertices are better off in M than in M They established the Gale Sotomayor s type theorem for minimum cardinality popular matchings and showed that any stable matching is a minimum cardinality popular matching We establish the same type of theorem for maximum cardinality popular matchings It implies that the family cal V of sets of endpoints of popular matchings has the unique maximum and minimum with respect to the inclusion relation combining with Huang Kavitha s result As a consequence one may naturally presume that cal V is closed under intersection and union and then cal V forms a distributive lattice We disprove the former presumption Kristiaan Glorie Margarida Carvalho Miguel Constantino Paul Bouman and Ana Viana Robust models for the Kidney Exchange Problem Abstract We consider the clearing of barter exchange markets in which proposed transactions must be verified before they can proceed Proposed transactions may fail to go forward if verification fails or if a participant withdraws The clearing problem for these markets is a combinatorial optimization problem that can be modeled as a vertex disjoint cycle packing problem in an unreliable digraph The arcs and nodes of this graph are subject to failure Our research finds a natural application in kidney exchange markets which aim to enable transplants between incompatible donor patient pairs A set of pairs must be chosen in such a way that each selected patient can receive a kidney from a compatible donor from another pair in the set The pairs are then notified and crossmatch tests must be performed to ensure the success of the transplants In this work we assume that in case one or more matches fail a new set of pairs may be selected The new set should be as close as possible to the initial set in order to minimize the material and emotional costs of the alteration We present a robust optimization approach that intends to maximize the number of pairs selected in both the first and second set in a worst case scenario David Cantala and Juan Pereyra Driven by priorities manipulations under the Boston mechanism Abstract Inspired from real life manipulations used when the Boston mechanism is in place we study school choice markets where students submit preferences driven by priorities they declare as more preferred those schools where they have high priority We prove that when students follow this type of strategies the outcome of the Boston mechanism is the school optimal stable matching Moreover the condition is necessary if the outcome of the Boston mechanism is the school optimal stable matching then preferences are driven by priorities Thus under these manipulations the final allocation of students may be purely shaped by schools priorities Additionally we run some computational simulations to show that the assumption of driven by priorities preferences can be relaxed by allowing non trivial degrees of idiosyncratic shocks in students preferences and our main results hold for almost all students Alexander Teytelboym Trading networks with bilateral contracts Abstract We consider general networks of bilateral contracts that include supply chains We define a new stability concept called path stability and show that any network of bilateral contracts has a path stable outcome whenever agents preferences satisfy full substitutability Path stable outcomes may not be immune to group deviations or efficient We extend previous results on group strategy proofness and the rural hospitals theorem When contracts specify trades and prices we also show that competitive equilibrium exists in networked markets even in the absence of transferrable utility The competitive equilibrium outcome is path stable Danny Munera Daniel Diaz Salvador Abreu Francesca Rossi Vijay Saraswat and Philippe Codognet A Local Search Algorithm for SMTI and its extension to HRT Problems Abstract Hospitals Residents with Ties HRT forms a class of problems with many applications some of which of considerable size Solving these problems have been shown to be NP hard In previous work we developed a local search algorithm which displays very high performance in solving Stable Matching with Ties and Incomplete lists SMTI problems In this paper we propose a method to tackle HRT problems with a slightly modified version of our SMTI solver We describe our method and provide an initial performance assessment which turns out to show that the resulting solver can deal with significant HR problems providing optimal solutions in most cases in a very short time Tamás Fleiner and Zsuzsanna Jankó On weighted kernels of two posets Abstract A recent result of Aharoni Berger and Gorelik is a weighted generalization of the well known theorem of Sands Sauer and Woodrow on monochromatic paths The authors prove the

    Original URL path: http://www.optimalmatching.com/MATCHUP2015/accepted-abstracts.html (2016-02-16)
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  • MATCH UP Workshops
    are not limited to two sided matchings involving agents on both sides e g college admissions resident allocation job markets school choice etc two sided matchings involving agents and items e g house allocation course allocation project allocation assigning papers to reviewers school choice etc one sided matchings roommates problem kidney exchanges etc matching with payments assignment game etc Previous MATCH UPs Previous workshops in the series have occurred as follows MATCH UP 2008 Reykjavík University Iceland 6 July 2008 41 participants MATCH UP 2012 Corvinus University of Budapest Hungary 19 20 July 2012 68 participants MATCH UP 2015 University of Glasgow UK 16 18 April 2015 80 participants Guiding principles Equal representation between the computer science and economics communities Mix of high profile invited speakers and contributed talks from established and early career researchers Dual format submission mechanism to allow for the different publishing traditions of the participating communities Format A not already published and not under submission elsewhere at most 12 pages accepted papers published in the proceedings Format B not already published but can be under submission elsewhere no page limit only abstract published in the proceedings Light touch reviewing process Proceedings not published formally but distributed

    Original URL path: http://www.optimalmatching.com/MATCHUP/ (2016-02-16)
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  • COST Action IC1205
    subjects partial capacities of schools and the number of acceptable schools each teacher is allowed to list We propose several approximation algorithms Finally we present integer programming models and their application to real data Gianluigi Greco University of Calabria Italy Mechanisms for Fair Allocation Problems in Verifiable Settings Mechanism design is considered in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with monetary compensation by focusing on problems where declarations on allocated goods can be verified before payments are performed A setting is discussed where verification might be subject to errors so that payments have to be awarded under the presumption of innocence as incorrect declared values do not necessarily mean manipulation attempts by the agents Within this setting a mechanism is illustrated that is truthful efficient and budget balanced Moreover utilities for the agents are fairly determined by the Shapley value of suitable coalitional games The computational complexity of the proposed mechanism is also discussed Martin Hoefer Max Planck Institut für Informatik Germany Dynamic Matching with Preferences This talk surveys our recent work on dynamic aspects of the matching problems with preferences On the one hand we consider dynamics in variants of stable matching where agents repeatedly deviate to blocking pairs We present some answers to natural questions for convergence can convergence to stable matchings can be guaranteed Are paths to stability short and can they be found efficiently On the other hand we consider dynamic matching scenarios where agents arrive and depart iteratively over time The goal here is to maintain in each round a matching that is to some extent preferred by the agents using a small amortized number changes over time We consider approximate versions of stable and popular matchings and quantify the tension between approximation and number of changes Scott Kominers Harvard University USA Strategy Proofness Investment Efficiency and Marginal Returns An Equivalence We show that a mechanism induces an agent to make efficient ex ante investment choices if and only if it rewards the agent with his marginal surplus additionally for an ex post efficient mechanism these properties are equivalent to strategy proofness for the agent Our results extend to settings with uncertainty moreover they have analogs for mechanisms that are only approximately efficient and approximately incentive compatible Among other applications our results imply both that under the worker optimal stable mechanism workers are incentivized to make efficient human capital investments before entering the labor market and that second price auctions induce efficient bidder participation Joint work with J W Hatfield and F Kojima Julien Lesca Paris Dauphine University France A Complexity Approach for Core Selecting Exchange with Multiple Indivisible Goods under Lexicographic Preferences Core selection is a crucial property of social choice functions or rules in social choice literature It is also desirable to address the incentive of agents to cheat by misreporting their preferences This paper investigates an exchange problem where each agent may have multiple indivisible goods agents preferences over sets of goods are assumed to be lexicographic and side payments

    Original URL path: http://www.optimalmatching.com/COST2015/ (2016-02-16)
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  • MATCH-UP workshop at ICALP 2008
    not limited to bipartite matching problems with preference lists on both sides where a matching is optimal if it is o stable this includes variants of the stable marriage and hospitals residents problems o rank maximal or otherwise optimal with respect to matching profile minimum cost popular or Pareto optimal bipartite matching problems with preferences on one side includes house allocation job matching student project allocation where a matching is optimal if it is o rank maximal or otherwise optimal with respect to matching profile minimum cost popular or Pareto optimal non bipartite matching problems with preferences includes kidney exchange chess tournament problems where a matching is optimal if it is o stable this includes variants of the stable roommates problem o rank maximal or otherwise optimal with respect to matching profile minimum cost popular or Pareto optimal Submissions Authors are invited to submit papers focussing on aspects of matching problems with preferences that are of relevance to the workshop Such a paper can either i be based on original results that have not been published previously or ii survey existing results that have already appeared in the literature provided that the majority of the survey text has not itself been published previously Submissions should be at most 12 pages in length using 11 point font or greater on A4 or US letter paper with at least 1 inch margins round the text Papers will be selected according to a relevance to the workshop b originality significance and rigour in the case of type i papers and c interest to the community and coverage of the literature in the case of type ii papers Submissions should be sent by email attachment to matchup dcs gla ac uk Accepted papers will be disseminated via the workshop website and informal working notes

    Original URL path: http://www.optimalmatching.com/workshop/ (2016-02-16)
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  • COST Action IC1205 Program
    information Committee COST action officials Ulle Endriss chair COST action IC1205 Nicolas Maudet chair WG2 on Fair Division Péter Bir oacute chair WG4 on Matching Local organisers Frances Cooper Augustine Kwanashie David Manlove co chair Iain McBride Herv eacute Moulin

    Original URL path: http://www.optimalmatching.com/COST2015/committee.html (2016-02-16)
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  • COST Action IC1205 Program
    changes over time We consider approximate versions of stable and popular matchings and quantify the tension between approximation and number of changes 10 30 11 15 Coffee break Room 305 Gilbert Scott building 11 15 12 00 Vangelis Markakis Athens University of Economics and Business Greece chair Sylvain Bouveret Approximation Algorithms for Computing Maximin Share Allocations We study the problem of computing maximin share guarantees a recently introduced fairness notion Given a set of n agents and a set of goods the maximin share of a single agent is the best that he can guarantee to himself if he partitions the goods into n bundles and receives his least desirable bundle The objective then is to find a partition so that each player is guaranteed his maximin share In the presence of indivisible goods such allocations are not guaranteed to exist hence we resort to approximation algorithms Our main result is a 2 3 approximation algorithm which runs in polynomial time for any number of agents and goods improving upon previous results in the literature We also investigate some special cases and provide better approximation guarantees Finally we provide a probabilistic analysis showing that maximin share allocations exist in most cases i e with probability 1 o 1 on randomly generated instances This is in accordance with the apparent difficulty reported in previous works for obtaining impossibility results 12 00 12 45 Haris Aziz NICTA and University of New South Wales Australia chair Sylvain Bouveret Cake Cutting Algorithms for Piecewise Constant and Piecewise Uniform Valuations Cake cutting is one of the most fundamental settings in fair division and mechanism design without money It has applications in scheduling and multi agent resource allocation We focus on cake cutting with piecewise constant valuations and consider different levels of three fundamental goals in cake cutting fairness Pareto optimality and strategyproofness We present three desirable algorithms which have their relative merits in achieving these goals Joint work with Chun Ye Columbia University 12 45 14 30 Lunch at the Glasgow University Union dining room map and directions 14 30 16 00 Rump session chair Ulle Endriss The following people all presented a 5 minute talk at the rump session Daniel Karabekyan Moscow Toby Walsh Sydney Annick Laruelle Bilbao Joanna Drummond Toronto Vedran Podobnik Zagreb Sergey Kadenko Kiev Giulia Rotundo Rome Hervé Moulin Glasgow Christian Klamler Graz Baharak Rastegari Glasgow Tommy Andersson Lund Murat Ali Cengelci Istanbul and Tamás Fleiner Budapest 16 00 16 30 Coffee break Room 305 Gilbert Scott building 16 30 18 15 Management Committee meeting chair Ulle Endriss 19 30 Dinner in the Terrace Lounge Hilton Glasgow Grosvenor map and directions Thursday 16 April 2015 Tuesday Wednesday 08 50 09 00 Opening remarks MATCH UP 2015 09 00 09 45 Joana Pais University of Lisbon Portugal chair David Manlove Affirmative Action through Minority Reserves An Experimental Study on School Choice Minority reserves are an affirmative action policy proposed by Hafalir et al in the context of school choice We study in

    Original URL path: http://www.optimalmatching.com/COST2015/program.html (2016-02-16)
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  • COST Action IC1205 Program
    Programme Registration Practical information Registration Registration covers entrance to the technical sessions coffee breaks lunches on Wednesday 15 April and Thursday 16 April and dinner on Wednesday 15 April Registration is now closed Please email matchup2015 dcs gla ac uk

    Original URL path: http://www.optimalmatching.com/COST2015/registration.html (2016-02-16)
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  • COST Action IC1205 Program
    1 9 Grosvenor Terrace Great Western Road Glasgow G12 0TA Reviews on Tripadvisor Closest to University about 7 minutes walking distance from the workshop venue Kelvingrove Hotel 3 ranked 47 of 89 hotels 944 Sauchiehall Street Glasgow G3 7TH Reviews on Tripadvisor About 15 minutes walking distance from the workshop venue Kelvin Hotel 2 ranked 53 of 89 hotels 15 Buckingham Terrace Great Western Road Glasgow G12 8EB Second closest to University about 8 minutes walking distance from the workshop venue Reviews on Tripadvisor West End B Bs 15 Glasgow ranked 2 of 36 B B 15 Woodside Place Glasgow G3 7QL About 20 minutes walking distance from the workshop venue Reviews on Tripadvisor Alamo Guest House ranked 3 of 36 B B 46 Gray Street Kelvingrove Park Glasgow G3 7SE About 15 minutes walking distance from the workshop venue Reviews on Tripadvisor The Flower House ranked 10 of 36 B B 33 St Vincent Crescent Glasgow G3 8NG About 20 minutes walking distance from the workshop venue Reviews on Tripadvisor Amadeus Guest house ranked 13 of 36 B B 411 North Woodside Road Glasgow G20 6NN About 15 minutes walking distance from the workshop venue Reviews on Tripadvisor City Centre hotels Premier Inn Glasgow City Centre Buchanan Galleries 3 ranked 2 of 89 hotels 141 West Nile Street St Andrew House Glasgow G1 2RN Close to Buchanan Street subway Reviews on TripAdvisor CitizenM Glasgow 4 ranked 8 of 89 hotels 60 Renfrew Street corner of Hope Street Glasgow G2 3BW Reviews on Tripadvisor Premier Inn Glasgow City Centre George Square 3 ranked 16 of 89 hotels 187 George Street Glasgow G1 1YU Close to Buchanan Street subway Reviews on Tripadvisor Grand Central Hotel 4 ranked 25 of 89 hotels 99 Gordon Street Glasgow G1 3SF Reviews on Tripadvisor Jurys Inn Glasgow 4 ranked 31 of 89 hotels 80 Jamaica Street Glasgow G1 4QG Reviews on Tripadvisor Holiday Inn Express Glasgow City Centre Theatreland 3 ranked 36 of 89 hotels 165 West Nile Street Glasgow G1 2RL Reviews on Tripadvisor Ibis Glasgow City Centre 2 ranked 46 of 89 hotels 220 West Regent Street Glasgow G2 4DQ Reviews on Tripadvisor City Centre B Bs Adelaides ranked 8 of 36 B B 209 Bath Street Glasgow G2 4HZ Reviews on Tripadvisor Map of the City Center Restaurants and Cafés Registration covers lunches and coffee breaks during the workshop as well as the workshop dinner on Wednesday 15 April For the few meals that are not provided or if you are planning to stay beyond the dates of the workshop we have listed some places here that we like to dine in or grab a bite at near the University in the West End and in the City Centre West End There are numerous restaurants pubs bars and cafés in the West End and near the University particularly on Byres Road Ashton lane and Great Western Road Here we have listed a few of our favourites Bothy 11 Ruthven Lane G12 9BG

    Original URL path: http://www.optimalmatching.com/COST2015/practical.html (2016-02-16)
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