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  • wp-9-6-00
    are connected is only a value of 500 This is to say that the water falling from the 1000 foot dam into the 500 foot dam will have only half the effect than if it fell all the way to the lower reach reference point The lowest potential in an electrical circuit is that to which all other potentials are referenced In an aircraft the airframe has the lowest potential in the electrical circuit A spark will seek the point that has the greatest differential potential difference between itself and another object Why then when one considers the physics of this event is another wire bundle more attractive than aircraft ground If I have two wires and one is at 1000 volts and another is a 500 volts and both of them run parallel to structure then structure is more attractive to either because the 1000 volt wire sees something that is 1000 volts away from itself whereas the 500 volt wire is only half as attractive as the ground If all the wires were at 1000 volts then none of the wires would appear attractive to the wire that is going to arc If an arc over is to occur then it is ground that will receive the arc not the surrounding wire bundles as they are also powered to a degree that makes them less attractive If the aircraft structure which happens to be closer to the hot wire bundle isn t enough of an attraction then neither is another wire bundle which is at a potential less attractive than aircraft ground Now further exacerbating the contention of an arc over is the fact that wire bundles are clamped at about every 20 to 22 inches in the 747 The clamps are rubber or plastic coated metal or

    Original URL path: http://twa800.com/news/wp-9-6-00.htm (2016-02-13)
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  • st-9-7-00
    a major part of the problem I get emails every day from frustrated airline captains and aerospace pros who can t believe how aviation reporters have swallowed the NTSB nonsense without question On the 22nd of August we were treated to the biggest NTSB whopper of them all Their final staff briefing blamed the 24 volt fuel quanity indicating system FQIS for picking up higher voltage elsewhere on the aircraft and producing a spark in the CWT Your people bought it hook line and sinker Had you bothered to interview anyone who has hands on knowledge of these aircraft systems they would have said if high voltage actually crossed to the FQIS 1 the in line diodes would have burned up at 60 to 80 volts but not before 2 pegging the fuel indication on that tank Considering that neither of these happened on TWA 800 the proposed scenerio should have been rejected out of hand Instead with your help the NTSB was able to successfully spin a non event into a cause for the loss of 230 lives Nice Job Another point in the intire history of jet air transport FQIS wiring has never caused a mishap CDR W

    Original URL path: http://twa800.com/news/st-9-7-00.htm (2016-02-13)
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  • scarry-9-21-00
    in the press begins at 9 14 PM when Swissair 111 s pilot requests permission to make an unscheduled landing at Boston the air controller in Moncton Canada reminds him that he is much closer to the Halifax airport than to Boston and asks him if he would prefer to land at Halifax At the moment of the 9 14 call the cockpit has smoke in it and as the data recorder would later reveal to Canadian investigators ten minutes later the computers on board suddenly begin receiving false information Over the next ninety seconds the autopilot disconnects the data grow more and more anomalous soon the plane s electrical systems fail altogether 14 Swissair 111 was an MD 11 a type of plane made by McDonnell Douglas and derived from the DC 10 When the MD 11 first appeared in the 1990s its design philosophy was widely celebrated 1 500 software engineers working in consultation with pilots from thirty seven airlines had created a plane that could fly smoothly while carrying out tremendous feats of self repair Even if the plane were to suffer multiple electrical faults its computers would quickly reconfigure the electrical systems instantly redistributing tasks among the plane s three electrical systems What was envisioned was not just that the plane would under duress buy time for its pilots and passengers it would diagnose and eliminate even a severe problem purring along as though nothing had happened 15 It may well be that Swissair 111 s problems began at 9 14 and that the plane s systems far from correcting themselves or buying time simply surrendered to the ever accelerating decline But it is also possible that Swissair 111 s electrical problems began much earlier and that for a time the plane did carry out acts of self repair What can be said with certainty is this It is not the case that Swissair 111 flew uneventfully up the New England coast In fact it suffered a serious problem and the problem first surfaced in the very zone where TWA 800 fell In the early stage of the flight while Swissair 111 was still traveling east along the southern coast of Long Island it lost radio contact with the eastern seaboard air controllers for thirteen minutes TWA 800 had begun its fatal fall and had lost the use of its radio transponder cockpit recorder and data box recorder at a clock time of 8 31 PM less than a minute after a normal radio exchange with the Boston air controllers Swissair 111 had its last normal exchange with the Boston air controllers at 8 33 PM after which it lost radio contact with every air controller on the northeast coast for the next thirteen minutes Under normal conditions exchanges between air controllers and pilots occur in pairs a call initiated by the air controller will be answered by the pilot who restates what the air controller has just said or the call may instead be initiated by the pilot who asks a question such as permission to climb to an altitude that has less wind turbulence which the air controller answers after which the pilot repeats the information to verify that the words have been heard and understood This pattern of call and recall is not a casual practice it is a required procedure While the sentences of pilots and air controllers normally occur in tight pairs there can be many factors that for a few seconds interrupt the rhythm of the call and recall pattern and necessitate a repetition of the call But the failure to answer is never taken lightly and if it continues it may become a matter of grave concern For a thirteen minute period from 8 33 PM until 8 47 PM no completed act of radio contact took place between Swissair 111 and the Boston area air controllers whose radars are positioned at Sardi on Long Island Hampton on Long Island Cape Cod Nantucket and Augusta Maine 16 As the plane progresses it is passed along from one controller to the next In Swissair 111 s last successful exchange at 8 33 the Hampton controller had told the pilot the radio frequency he should now use as he begins to enter the Cape Cod airspace and the pilot had accurately repeated back to him that new frequency Hampton Controller Swissair 111 Boston17 one two eight point seven five Swissair 111 One two eight seven five One Eleven right Hampton Controller Good bye 18 From this point forward Swissair 111 should be in communication with the Cape sector But the Cape controller cannot reach the plane and so at 8 34 PM he asks the Hampton controller to try to reach him on the old frequency Try him again thanks Hampton Controller Swissair 111 Center 19 Swissair 111 no response 20 The radio21 a commercial pilot uses for communication with air traffic control has a double screen the frequency used for one sector in this case Hampton is kept in place on the first screen when the new frequency in this case Cape is dialed in on the second screen That way the pilot can quickly get back to the first frequency should he discover that he has misheard or misdialed the new frequency But Swissair 111 can now be reached on neither frequency though it remains visible on radar22 Unable to reach Swissair 111 the Hampton controller goes on to normal exchanges with other planes in the area he instructs a plane addressed as Echo Charley to descend and maintain a specified altitude and Echo Charley repeats back the altitude he instructs a Delta flight to proceed to its destination and the Delta flight repeats back the instruction The clock moves forward to 8 36 and the Cape controller renews his efforts to reach Swissair 111 Cape Controller Swissair 111 Climb and maintain flight level three one zero 31 000 Swissair 111 no response 23 Cape Controller Swissair 111 Boston Swissair 111 no response 24 The Cape controller now contacts the associated25 controller at Hampton to enlist his help once more Hampton Associated Controller Hampton Cape Controller Try Swissair 111 again please Hampton Associated Controller We tried him he s not here We ll try him again Cape Controller O K 26 At 8 38 the four step cycle begins one last time Step one the Cape controller tries and fails to reach the plane Cape Controller Swissair 111 Cleared direct to Bradd 27 Swissair 111 no response Cape Controller Swissair 111 Swissair 111 Hear Boston Center Contact Boston one two eight point seven five one two eight point seven five If you hear Boston ident Swissair 111 no response Step two the Cape associated controller contacts the Hampton associated controller to ask for help Hampton Associated Controller Hampton Cape Associated Controller Yes This is Cape Could you try Swissair 111 again off of Kennedy 28 Hampton Associated Controller speaking to Hampton controller Try Swissair 111again Gary Cape Associated Controller Thanks Bob 29 Step three the Hampton air controller now twice tries to reach the plane once by calling the name of the plane and announcing the radio frequency to be used for contact then by calling the name and identifying who it is that is attempting to reach him Hampton Controller Swissair 111 One twenty eight seventy five Swissair 111 no response Hampton Controller Swissair 111 Center Swissair 111 no response Step four having observed the failed exchange between the Hampton controller and the pilot the Hampton associated controller now reports the unhappy result to the Cape associated controller Cape Associated Controller Ya Go ahead Hampton Associated Controller Negative joy on that Swissair 30 Cape Associated Controller O K then Thanks 31 Although Swissair 111 is still in the air it has lost radio contact Swissair 111 off the air for a total of thirteen minutes eventually does get back in contact with the air controller The pilot s voice first comes through not at the air controller station at Hampton Cape Cod or Nantucket but at Augusta Maine The Augusta air controller at first believes he is receiving a call from a different Swissair plane flight 104 one that is flying in the Augusta region airspace but he quickly corrects himself and swiftly relays to the Swissair 111 pilot the frequency on which he should contact Boston Swissair 111 Boston Center Swissair 111 heavy 32 Augusta Air Controller Is that Swissair 104 Swissair 111 Negative This is Swissair 111 Here Swissair 111 and Swissair 104 begin to speak simultaneously Augusta Air Controller Stand by Swissair 104 Swissair 111 Boston Center Swissair 111 Boston Center Swissair 111 Go ahead Augusta Air Controller Swissair 111 contact Boston Center one three three point four five frequency 133 45 Swissair 111 Three three four five Swissair 111 33 The time is 8 47 34 A moment later at 8 48 Swissair 111 successfully contacts Boston s Nantucket sector Swissair 111 Boston Center Swissair 111 heavy Nantucket Air Controller I m sorry Who was that last call Swissair 111 Boston Center Swissair 111 heavy is calling 133 45 Nantucket Air Controller Swissair 111 Boston Center roger How do you read Swisssair 111 I read you loud and clear Go ahead Nantucket Air Controller Swissair 111 Climb to flight level two niner zero Higher shortly Swissair 111 Level two niner zero Swissair 111 35 Other than the spirited inquiry about legibility How do you read I read you loud and clear the air controller and pilot do not stop to welcome one another back or to discuss the previous radio blackout They at once turn to the business at hand the resumption of the scheduled climb to 33 000 feet that had been interrupted at 27 000 feet when the radio transmissions were suspended The confident tone and the reassuringly professional procedure of information given two niner zero and repeated two niner zero continue over a sequence of exchanges about altitude and radio frequency until 8 58 when the Nantucket controller passes the plane on to the Moncton controller in Canada Radio contact has been restored a normal flight has been regained the events of the previous quarter hour now seem and may actually only be an uneventful anomaly a passing fluke But before too many more minutes pass a lethal set of events as we now know will begin to take place and the possibility exists that the fatal sequence of events is linked to the earlier events that the electrical and radio systems36 of Swissair 111 were already under strain37 and that although the relatively new plane was able for a time to withstand or compensate for whatever was affecting it eventually it lost the capacity to do so Two questions are raised by the thirteen minute blackout First is the blackout related to the final set of catastrophic events Second if the blackout is related to the final catastrophe does that tell us anything about whether the problem originates from a source inside or outside the plane It tells us that external as well as internal causes need to be scrutinized The fact that Swissair 111 begins to have radio trouble at the time when and place where TWA 800 suffered its swift catastrophe increases our obligation to include external agents in the overall inquiry Almost as mysterious as the thirteen minute silence of the pilots is the silence of the FAA and our country s Safety Board after the accident What can account for their not having reported to the public the radio troubles suffered by Swissair 111 as it progressed along the southern shore of Long Island where its sister plane had fallen in an earlier summer and up the sea lanes running beside New England Why was it important to confine the accident to Canadian airspace and Canadian waters in the public imagination 38 Common sense presses us to consider the possibility that the thirteen minute radio blackout may bear on what by 9 14 had become a swiftly accelerating electrical catastrophe So too does certain supplementary information First it is highly unlikely to be the case that the pilot simply dialed the wrong frequency when his plane was handed off from the Hampton to the Cape sector as noted earlier the pilot reads back the correct Cape frequency when the Hampton controller gives it to him further pilots have multiple radio screens and leave one tuned on the old frequency Second it cannot be the case that the pilot distracted by a meal or a book or a conversation or an extraordinary cloud formation simply forgot that he was in the midst of a climb or that he was passing though one of the busiest corridors in the world The voice of this pilot both before the blackout and once his radio returns is professional crisp quick he consistently responds to each air controller s call a split second after he receives it and often recites back the information in the precise order in which it has been given One Swissair official has said that of 450 pilots who fly the MD 11 this particular pilot was considered one of the top five 39 Captain Urs Zimmermann s professional reputation and voice signature alone should persuade us that he was incapable of neglecting air traffic communication But if more evidence is needed there is the MD 11 s sophisticated data recorder which registers whenever a pilot attempts to key into the communication system it shows that during the thirteen minute blackout the pilots of Swissair 111 made repeated attempts to initiate radio contact 40 Third it cannot be the case that either United States or Swiss flight procedures permit such a blackout to pass with a complacent shrug or a bemused scratch of the head In 1990 the US House of Representatives held a hearing on Pilot Air Traffic Controllers Communication Issues The hearings enumerated twelve kinds of communication error and the potentially fatal consequences of even the most seemingly minor of them such as two people attempting to speak at the same time for several seconds The twelve kinds of problem had earlier been outlined by a 1988 aviation industry report entitled A Call to Action Included are such problems as an air controller using an abbreviation that could stand for two different planes a pilot s accent making it hard for the air controller to determine whether he has accurately understood the instruction and a blocked line occurring when one pilot attempts to use a frequency shared with other pilots one of whom is at that moment already speaking At several points the report specifies with alarm the duration of a given problem and it is never close to Swissair 111 s thirteen minute blackout frequency blockage for several minutes is cited as though a self evidently alarming situation a stuck mike 41 that lasted for five minutes is a second example radio contact lost for twenty miles two or three minutes in a commercial plane is a third example If several minutes or two minutes or five minutes of lost communication requires an industry call to action and hearings before the House of Representatives how can a thirteen minute gap be considered a problem too minor even to mention in the press in the United States How can it be too minor to mention when it unlike the shorter communication blackouts cited in the congressional hearings was prelude to a fatal plane crash 3 TWA 800 and Swissair 111 then share at least five features 1 a grave electrical accident 2 a so far indecipherable cause 3 a takeoff from the same airport and a route across the same geography 4 a takeoff on the same minute of the day and day of the week and 5 the malfunctioning of its radios beginning at almost the same time somewhere in the three minute interval between 8 31 and 8 34 42 Should these five features be seen as extraneous a set of interesting but ultimately insignificant coincidences Or are they instead features that together expose the cause of the accidents Either answer could be correct The only way to learn which is accurate is to investigate the second possibility with the greatest possible rigor and speed Has the United States investigative team the American researchers who are assisting the primarily Canadian investigation under taken to reconstruct the external environment through which Swissair 111 flew There is to date no public sign of any such reconstruction If United States investigators wait until every possible internal cause has been explored before they begin to look at the external possibilities will it be possible to construct an accurate and complete record of that external environment The memories of air control lers pilots in the area and seamen are clearer today than they will be in two years their assistance in reconstructing the external environment should therefore be sought today not two years from today External explanations need to be pursued for exactly the same reasons that internal explanations are already being urgently pursued because there is an absolute need to know the cause of these two isolated catastrophes and because there is an absolute need to prevent other planes from crashing From what we know about the external environment a sixth feature shared by TWA 800 and Swissair 111 begins to come into view The two planes attempted to make their flights on an evening when military craft were in the air or sea below The route from JFK International Airport east along the southern coast of Long Island and north past the New England shoreline requires any plane on its way to northern Europe to thread its way through a ribbon of air that is skirted on one side or the other by military warning zones The boundaries of each zone are marked on aviation maps and labeled with the letter W followed by a number

    Original URL path: http://twa800.com/news/scarry-9-21-00.htm (2016-02-13)
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  • shultz-9-9-00
    to recognize the existance of what I will call The FQIS Explosive Voltage fail safe diode circuitry as this would further weaken an already weak theory with no supporting hard evidence It appears the Honeywell engineers are the authors of the Diode circuitry and you can understand why If their FQIS design requiring wires voltages currents Jules to run into the CWT they would be vulnerable to all kinds of grief when the first tank blew up BOEING What your designers didn t consider the possibilty of a stray explosive voltage finding it s way into our fuel tanks riding on your FQIS wiring you idiots What I find frustrating is that neither Boeing nor the NTSB provides a simplified schematic drawing of the FL 800 FQIS showing relationships of wire runs their relative distances and length of runs their different shielding grounding and insulation methods the location of the fail safe diodes etc I am no stranger to the intracacies of wiring coupling phenomena and potential sneak paths between differnt circiuts But I cannot tottaly understand the Boeing plain vanilla text page C10 without a schematic to support what the words are trying to say After all 230 innocent

    Original URL path: http://twa800.com/news/st-9-9-00.htm (2016-02-13)
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  • vv-9-13-00
    central to the NTSB case that the center tank exploded and caused the accident Lacking any evidence of an ignition source the Safety Board did the flight test and other tests to show that the atmosphere inside the tank with possibly 50 gallons of fuel was flammable But even if a flame is produced that does not necessarily mean an explosion will follow The mere existence of a normal flame does not by itself imply the beginning of an explosion notes a NASA addendum to the NTSB s Systems Report A spark is just one link in a chain For an explosion to happen a spark has to ignite all the fuel air mixture in a very rapid burning reaction But this cannot be counted on especially in a large container like TWA 800 s center tank where there was so little fuel to begin with and where temperatures varied widely In such a situation with some temperatures hovering down near 100oF a small spark may simply have puffed and gone out according to Kurt H Strauss a nationally recognized aviation fuel expert Whether an explosion happened would depend on total energy released when that ignition goes off said Strauss Given that the tank exploded the NTSB s rationale connecting the blast to the fuselage damage rests on surprisingly shaky ground According to Jon Hjelm a Federal Aviation Administration engineer and member of the Sequencing Group who contributed pages of stress calculations as a kind of reality check on the deliberations of the group an enormous force equivalent to more than the thrust produced by one of the 747 s jet engines acted on the bottom of the tank to produce the cracking that sundered the fuselage in front of the tank Hjelm said he came up with his figure for this force using assumptions he made about the distribution of the pressure from the explosion Hjelm said that in order for his calculations to confirm the breakup sequence he made another assumption The force had to remain pushing down inside the tank after the explosion had ruptured the front of the tank For how long Maybe some number of seconds Way more than one second Hjelm said What if the the pressure all dissipated in under one second Hjelm said That s a question I feel uneasy to deal with Yet according to the results of the NTSB s own explosive testing and scientists questioned by the Voice not to mention the account of the breakup sequence given by Sequencing Group chairman Jim Wildey at the NTSB s Baltimore hearings in 1997 the initial explosion was certainly over within one second Wildey said in Baltimore that the Sequencing Group had relied upon Hjelm s calculations which constitute apparently the only available engineering analysis of the breakup sequence Boeing according to its submission to the NTSB did not complete a project to create a computer model of the breakup Dr David Mayer who holds a doctorate in applied experimental psychology

    Original URL path: http://twa800.com/news/vv-9-13-00.htm (2016-02-13)
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  • to-9-10-00
    is proved correct it suggests navy ships and air force planes pose a lethal threat to passenger flights Crash investigators have been startled by similarities between several tragedies In particular they have uncovered common features in two crashes Swissair 111 on 2 September 1998 and TWA 800 on 17 July 1996 Both planes took off from the same airport New York s JFK on the same day a Wednesday at the same minute 8 19pm Both followed the same route over Long Island Both reported trouble in the same region of airspace and both suffered catastrophic electrical malfunctions And on both occasions the planes were flying at a time when extensive military exercises involving submarines and US Navy P3 fighter planes were being conducted These factors outlined by Elaine Scarry in the forthcoming issue of the New York Review of Books suggest to many investigators that a routine weekly event probably involving the generation of strong electromagnetic pulses by military personnel may have triggered short circuits in the two planes In the case of the TWA 800 flight this could have caused a spark to set off a fire in its fuel tanks Alternatively a pulse could have knocked out

    Original URL path: http://twa800.com/news/to-9-10-00.htm (2016-02-13)
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  • firo-9-18-00
    National Security See the first article linked below for the full story 1 National Security Invoked Regarding TWA Flight 800 at http flight800 org nat security htm Discusses the Navy s decision to invoke national security to hide information concerning the movement of significant naval units on the night Flight 800 crashed Details various ship movements near the crash site and highlights the closest ship 3 miles which the FBI

    Original URL path: http://twa800.com/news/firo-9-18-00.htm (2016-02-13)
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  • nyo-9-25-00
    center right there is the Association of Retired Aviation Professionals ARAP and former staffers to Congressman Michael Forbes whose district the plane went down in notably his former administrative assistant Kelly O Meara now a reporter for Insight There s former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Thomas Moorer there s Accuracy in Media There s the Village Voice and the widow of a Lockerbie victim who was appointed to a select Presidential commission on airline safety and who has now sued the government saying her dissent on TWA 800 was cast aside On the lib left there are Dr Tom Stalcup and Graeme Sephton who have brilliantly analyzed the government s radar data for the Flight 800 Independent Research Organization or FIRO There s former CBS producer Kristina Borjesson who went out the door in part over this case Not to mention all the eyewitnesses on Long Island whose accounts are insulted in the latest National Transportation Safety Board report Some of the questions these people raise are so compelling four seconds of crucial data from the flight data recorder seem to have been removed says former TWA pilot Howard Mann that any reasonable person who hears them has to at least question the official version These questions have been taken up in countless places outside the mainstream The French and Australian press have covered Stalcup and Sephton for instance Or there s the respected travel writer Joe Brancatelli of biztravel com who has attacked the F B I for bullying the NTSB and corrupting the investigation A poll by Aviation Week lately found that two thirds of its respondents did not believe the government findings on TWA 800 But the Clinton court cannot abide the skepticism The critics are routinely written off as conspiracy theorists their points

    Original URL path: http://twa800.com/news/nyo-9-25-00.htm (2016-02-13)
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