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    weapons across the Canadian border into the United States The group the Gama a al Islamiya comprises followers of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman a blind Egyptian cleric jailed in the United States over the 1993 New York World Trade Center bombing A senior White House official responsible for counter terrorism told The Sunday Times this weekend that he had seen a report that a Stinger missile had been smuggled into

    Original URL path: http://twa800.com/news/timesoflondon-8-25-96.htm (2016-02-13)
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    and crosswind takeoff and landing Only under an extreme condition such as loss of a flap midair collision or where an airplane has pitched to a very high pitch attitude and a pushover or thrust change has already been unsuccessful should careful rudder input in the direction of the desired roll be considered Boeing said A rudder input is never the preferred initial response for events such as a wake vortex encounter windshear encounter or to reduce bank angle preceding an imminent stall recovery Well now THAT certainly takes care of the Airbus crash obvious to Boeing now the pilots used their rudder below design maneuvering speed and caused the tail to decide to leave the aircraft for a swim That s time to break out the Champagne in France because design maneuvering speed no longer applies to transport aircraft To continue Boeing also cautioned that sequential full or nearly full authorityrudder reversals may not be within the structural design limits of the airplane even if the airspeed is below the design maneuvering speed noting that no Boeing procedures require this type of pilot input Besides over stressing a vertical fin rudder reversals can put excessive structural loads on other parts of an airplane such as engine struts GeeJessieLee Now we have not only negated forever the FAA definition of Design Maneuvering Speed but we also have absolved all those crashes and upsets on Boeing 737s that Boeing earlier reluctantly admitted was indeed a design problem No more WHAT IS GOING ON HERE IS MERELY AN ATTEMPT TO CHANGE THE RULES Here is another example of a rule change The bastard helicoper yes no airplane V22 Osprey program has been in deep trouble with a number of soldier killing crashes So now the rules are being changed by the Navy

    Original URL path: http://twa800.com/news/avweb-5-23-02.htm (2016-02-13)
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    become a critically important post in this security conscious age of international terrorism On April 19 1995 Magaw was director of the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms You may remember that date in history It was the day the Oklahoma City federal building was bombed I was very concerned about that day and issued memos to all our field offices Magaw explained They were put on the alert As a result of that alert no ATF field agents in the Murrah Building were killed or injured even though they were the apparent target of the bombing No one else in the building got any warning so 168 men women and children were killed But no ATF agent got a scratch Magaw did a great job of protecting his own that day but he didn t do much to protect innocent civilians The next time I heard about John Magaw was a year later In 1996 Congress passed a contemptible piece of legislation known as the Gun Free Zones Act It created a 1 000 foot gun free zone around every school in America thus ensuring the Columbines to come But No Draw Magaw still the ATF director interpreted this law in an amazingly broad fashion one that betrayed his persona as a gun grabbing activist rather than a responsible public official serving the best interest of the taxpayers and under the authority of the U S Constitution Magaw expressed the opinion in writing to at least one member of Congress that schools in the case of the Gun Free Zones Act included home schools that are operated under state law In other words Magaw decided it was against the law for home schooling families to own guns and equally illegal for gun owners to home school That wasn t

    Original URL path: http://twa800.com/news/wnd-5-27-02.htm (2016-02-13)
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    requiring much more than probable cause before approving affidavits maybe if quantified 75 80 probability and sometimes even higher and depending on the actual AUSA who would be assigned might turn us down As a tactical choice I therefore thought it would be better to pursue the other route the FISA search warrant first the reason being that there is a common perception which for lack of a better term I ll call the smell test which has arisen that if the FBI can t do something through straight up criminal methods it will then resort to using less demanding intelligence methods Of course this isn t true but I think the perception still exists So by this line of reasoning I was afraid that if we first attempted to go criminal and failed to convince an AUSA we wouldn t pass the smell test in subsequently seeking a FISA I thought our best chances therefore lay in first seeking the FISA Both of the factors that influenced my thinking are areas arguably in need of improvement requiring an excessively high standard of probable cause in terrorism cases and getting rid of the smell test perception It could even be argued that FBI agents especially in terrorism cases where time is of the essence should be allowed to go directly to federal judges to have their probable cause reviewed for arrests or searches without having to gain the USAO s approval 4 5 The fact is that key FBIHQ personnel whose job it was to assist and coordinate with field division agents on terrorism investigations and the obtaining and use of FISA searches and who theoretically were privy to many more sources of intelligence information than field division agents continued to almost inexplicably 5 throw up roadblocks and undermine Minneapolis by now desperate efforts to obtain a FISA search warrant long after the French intelligence service provided its information and probable cause became clear HQ personnel brought up almost ridiculous questions in their apparent efforts to undermine the probable cause 6 In all of their conversations and correspondence HQ personnel never disclosed to the Minneapolis agents that the Phoenix Division had only approximately three weeks earlier warned of Al Qaeda operatives in flight schools seeking flight training for terrorist purposes Nor did FBIHQ personnel do much to disseminate the information about Moussaoui to other appropriate intelligence law enforcement authorities When in a desperate 11th hour measure to bypass the FBIHQ roadblock the Minneapolis Division undertook to directly notify the CIA s Counter Terrorist Center CTC FBIHQ personnel actually chastised the Minneapolis agents for making the direct notification without their approval 6 Eventually on August 28 2001 after a series of e mails between Minneapolis and FBIHQ which suggest that the FBIHQ SSA deliberately further undercut the FISA effort by not adding the further intelligence information which he had promised to add that supported Moussaoui s foreign power connection and making several changes in the wording of the information that had been provided by the Minneapolis Agent the Minneapolis agents were notified that the NSLU Unit Chief did not think there was sufficient evidence of Moussaoui s connection to a foreign power Minneapolis personnel are to this date unaware of the specifics of the verbal presentations by the FBIHQ SSA to NSLU or whether anyone in NSLU ever was afforded the opportunity to actually read for him herself all of the information on Moussaoui that had been gathered by the Minneapolis Division and the French intelligence service Obviously verbal presentations are far more susceptible to mis characterization and error The e mail communications between Minneapolis and FBIHQ however speak for themselves and there are far better witnesses than me who can provide their first hand knowledge of these events characterized in one Minneapolis agent s e mail as FBIHQ is setting this up for failure My only comment is that the process of allowing the FBI supervisors to make changes in affidavits is itself fundamentally wrong just as in the follow up to FBI Laboratory Whistleblower Frederic Whitehurst s allegations this process was revealed to be wrong in the context of writing up laboratory results With the Whitehurst allegations this process of allowing supervisors to re write portions of laboratory reports was found to provide opportunities for over zealous supervisors to skew the results in favor of the prosecution In the Moussaoui case it was the opposite the process allowed the Headquarters Supervisor to downplay the significance of the information thus far collected in order to get out of the work of having to see the FISA application through or possibly to avoid taking what he may have perceived as an unnecessary career risk 7 I understand that the failures of the FBIHQ personnel involved in the Moussaoui matter are also being officially excused because they were too busy with other investigations the Cole bombing and other important terrorism matters but the Supervisor s taking of the time to read each word of the information submitted by Minneapolis and then substitute his own choice of wording belies to some extent the notion that he was too busy As an FBI division legal advisor for 12 years and an FBI agent for over 21 years I can state that an affidavit is better and will tend to be more accurate when the affiant has first hand information of all the information he she must attest to Of necessity agents must continually rely upon information from confidential sources third parties and other law enforcement officers in drafting affidavits but the repeating of information from others greatly adds to the opportunities for factual discrepancies and errors to arise To the extent that we can minimize the opportunity for this type of error to arise by simply not allowing unnecessary re writes by supervisory staff it ought to be done I m not talking of course about mere grammatical corrections but changes of some substance as apparently occurred with the Moussaoui information which had to be for lack of a better term filtered through FBIHQ before any action whether to seek a criminal or a FISA warrant could be taken Even after September 11th the fear was great on the part of Minneapolis Division personnel that the same FBIHQ personnel would continue their filtering with respect to the Moussaoui investigation and now with the added incentive of preventing their prior mistakes from coming to light For this reason for weeks Minneapolis prefaced all outgoing communications ECs in the PENTTBOM investigation with a summary of the information about Moussaoui We just wanted to make sure the information got to the proper prosecutive authorities and was not further suppressed This fear was probably irrational but was nonetheless understandable in light of the Minneapolis agents prior experiences and frustrations involving FBIHQ The redundant preface information regarding Moussaoui on otherwise unrelative PENTTBOM communications has ended up adding to criminal discovery issues but this is the reason it was done 7 Although the last thing the FBI or the country needs now is a witch hunt I do find it odd that to my knowledge no inquiry whatsoever was launched of the relevant FBIHQ personnel s actions a long time ago Despite FBI leaders full knowledge of all the items mentioned herein and probably more that I m unaware of the SSA his unit chief and other involved HQ personnel were allowed to stay in their positions and what s worse occupy critical positions in the FBI s SIOC Command Center post September 11th The SSA in question actually received a promotion some months afterward It s true we all make mistakes and I m not suggesting that HQ personnel in question ought to be burned at the stake but we all need to be held accountable for serious mistakes I m relatively certain that if it appeared that a lowly field office agent had committed such errors of judgment the FBI s OPR would have been notified to investigate and the agent would have at the least been quickly reassigned I m afraid the FBI s failure to submit this matter to OPR and to the IOB gives further impetus to the notion raised previously by many in the FBI of a double standard which results in those of lower rank being investigated more aggressively and dealt with more harshly for misconduct while the misconduct of those at the top is often overlooked or results in minor disciplinary action From all appearances this double standard may also apply between those at FBIHQ and those in the field 8 The last official fact that I take issue with is not really a fact but an opinion and a completely unsupported opinion at that In the day or two following September 11th you Director Mueller made the statement to the effect that if the FBI had only had any advance warning of the attacks we meaning the FBI may have been able to take some action to prevent the tragedy Fearing that this statement could easily come back to haunt the FBI upon revelation of the information that had been developed pre September 11th about Moussaoui I and others in the Minneapolis Office immediately sought to reach your office through an assortment of higher level FBIHQ contacts in order to quickly make you aware of the background of the Moussaoui investigation and forewarn you so that your public statements could be accordingly modified When such statements from you and other FBI officials continued we thought that somehow you had not received the message and we made further efforts Finally when similar comments were made weeks later in Assistant Director Caruso s congressional testimony in response to the first public leaks about Moussaoui we faced the sad realization that the remarks indicated someone possibly with your approval had decided to circle the wagons at FBIHQ in an apparent effort to protect the FBI from embarrassment and the relevant FBI officials from scrutiny Everything I have seen and heard about the FBI s official stance and the FBI s internal preparations in anticipation of further congressional inquiry had unfortunately confirmed my worst suspicions in this regard After the details began to emerge concerning the pre September 11th investigation of Moussaoui and subsequently with the recent release of the information about the Phoenix EC your statement has changed The official statement is now to the effect that even if the FBI had followed up on the Phoenix lead to conduct checks of flight schools and the Minneapolis request to search Moussaoui s personal effects and laptop nothing would have changed and such actions certainly could not have prevented the terrorist attacks and resulting loss of life With all due respect this statement is as bad as the first It is also quite at odds with the earlier statement which I m surprised has not already been pointed out by those in the media I don t know how you or anyone at FBI Headquarters no matter how much genius or prescience you may possess could so blithely make this affirmation without anything to back the opinion up than your stature as FBI Director The truth is as with most predictions into the future no one will ever know what impact if any the FBI s following up on those requests would have had Although I agree that it s very doubtful that the full scope of the tragedy could have been prevented it s at least possible we could have gotten lucky and uncovered one or two more of the terrorists in flight training prior to September 11th just as Moussaoui was discovered after making contact with his flight instructors It is certainly not beyond the realm of imagination to hypothesize that Moussaoui s fortuitous arrest alone even if he merely was the 20th hijacker allowed the hero passengers of Flight 93 to overcome their terrorist hijackers and thus spare more lives on the ground And even greater casualties possibly of our Nation s highest government officials may have been prevented if Al Qaeda intended for Moussaoui to pilot an entirely different aircraft There is therefore at least some chance that discovery of other terrorist pilots prior to September 11th may have limited the September 11th attacks and resulting loss of life Although your conclusion otherwise has to be very reassuring for some in the FBI to hear being repeated so often as if saying it s so may make it so I think your statements demonstrate a rush to judgment to protect the FBI at all costs I think the only fair response to this type of question would be that no one can pretend to know one way or another Mr Director I hope my observations can be taken in a constructive vein They are from the heart and intended to be completely apolitical Hopefully with our nation s security on the line you and our nation s other elected and appointed officials can rise above the petty politics that often plague other discussions and do the right thing You do have some good ideas for change in the FBI but I think you have also not been completely honest about some of the true reasons for the FBI s pre September 11th failures Until we come clean and deal with the root causes the Department of Justice will continue to experience problems fighting terrorism and fighting crime in general I have used the we term repeatedly herin to indicate facts about others in the Minneapolis Office at critical times but none of the opinions expressed herin can be attributed to anyone but myself I know that those who know me would probably describe me as by nature overly opinionated and sometimes not as discreet as I should be Certainly some of the above remarks may be interpreted as falling into that category but I really do not intend anything as a personal criticism of you or anyone else in the FBI to include the FBIHQ personnel who I believe were remiss and mishandled their duties with regard to the Moussaoui investigation Truly my only purpose is to try to provide the facts within my purview so that an accurate assessment can be obtained and we can learn from our mistakes I have pointed out a few of the things that I think should be looked at but there are many many more 8 An honest acknowledgment of the FBI s mistakes in this and other cases should not lead to increasing the Headquarters bureaucracy and approval levels of investigative actions as the answer Most often field office agents and field office management on the scene will be better suited to the timely and effective solution of crimes and in some lucky instances to the effective prevention of crimes including terrorism incidents The relatively quick solving of the recent mailbox pipe bombing incidents which resulted in no serious injuries to anyone are a good example of effective field office work actually several field offices working together and there are hundreds of other examples Although FBIHQ personnel have no doubt been of immeasurable assistance to the field over the years I m hard pressed to think of any case which has been solved by FBIHQ personnel and I can name several that have been screwed up Decision making is inherently more effective and timely when decentralized instead of concentrated Your plans for an FBI Headquarters Super Squad simply fly in the face of an honest appraisal of the FBI s pre September 11th failures The Phoenix Minneapolis and Paris Legal Attache Offices reacted remarkably exhibiting keen perception and prioritization skills regarding the terrorist threats they uncovered or were made aware of pre September 11th The same cannot be said for the FBI Headquarters bureaucracy and you want to expand that Should we put the counterterrorism unit chief and SSA who previously handled the Moussaoui matter in charge of the new Super Squad You are also apparently disregarding the fact the Joint Terrorism Task Forces JTTFs operating out of field divisions for years the first and chief one being New York City s JTTF have successfully handled numerous terrorism investigations and in some instances successfully prevented acts of terrorism There s no denying the need for more and better intelligence and intelligence management but you should think carefully about how much gate keeping power should be entrusted with any HQ entity If we are indeed in a war shouldn t the Generals be on the battlefield instead of sitting in a spot removed from the action while still attempting to call the shots I have been an FBI agent for over 21 years and for what it s worth have never received any form of disciplinary action throughout my career From the 5th grade when I first wrote the FBI and received the 100 Facts about the FBI pamphlet this job has been my dream I feel that my career in the FBI has been somewhat exemplary having entered on duty at a time when there was only a small percentage of female Special Agents I have also been lucky to have had four children during my time in the FBI and am the sole breadwinner of a family of six Due to the frankness with which I have expressed myself and my deep feelings on these issues which is only because I feel I have a somewhat unique inside perspective of the Moussaoui matter the gravity of the events of September 11th and the current seriousness of the FBI s and United States ongoing efforts in the war against terrorism I hope my continued employment with the FBI is not somehow placed in jeopardy I have never written to an FBI Director in my life before on any topic Although I would hope it is not necessary I would therefore wish to take advantage of the federal Whistleblower Protection provisions by so characterizing my remarks Sincerely Coleen M Rowley Special Agent and Minneapolis

    Original URL path: http://twa800.com/news/fbi-5-21-02.htm (2016-02-13)
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    it simply disappeared from the radar screen and crashed into the sea in waters about 30 miles off the coast of western Taiwan Officials say there was no mayday or distress call from the experienced cockpit crew The plane was flying at its normal cruising altitude of 35 000 feet when the catastrophe took place A few moments ago the chairman of China Airlines was quoted as saying he did not think mechanical difficulties were likely to have caused the crash noting that any kind of major mechanical malfunction would have given pilots enough time to radio a distress call There are reports from some eyewitnesses fishermen in the area in the water where the plane came down being quoted by Taiwan television as hearing a loud explosion and some farmers in western Taiwan have found bits of debris in their fields So there is some speculation that there might have been an explosion on board The plane was built in 1979 and was one of the oldest in the China Airlines fleet Although it had been inspected recently it was due to be retired soon because of its age China Airlines has one of the worst safety records in

    Original URL path: http://twa800.com/news/cnn-5-25-02.htm (2016-02-13)
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    FBI report formerly classified as secret an FBI radar analysis contradicting the NTSB s official crash sequence and official eyewitness drawings of an apparent missile engagement follow the petition Today the petition was informally submitted to NTSB Chairperson Blakey and FIRO will formally submit the petition to the NTSB after the parties to the investigation e g Boeing TWA etc receive their copies Anyone may view the petition in Adobe

    Original URL path: http://twa800.com/news/petition-5-21-02.htm (2016-02-13)
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    objected to requiring nonflammable gases considering the cost The task force put the cost at 10 billion to 20 billion The FAA which previously sought new inspections and fuel tank designs has started to test equipment to add noncombustible gases to the fuel tanks The technology is proving more promising than we originally thought FAA spokesman Les Dorr said The safety board s aviation safety director John Clark said such a system would cost less than expected In addition the air displaced by the noncombustible gases could become another source of oxygen for passengers an unexpected cost saving Clark said Observed safety board chairwoman Marion Blakey It does look as though real progress is being made The House Transportation Committee has passed legislation to require the Transportation Department to file annual reports on its response to each safety board recommendation Since its creation in 1967 the board has issued 11 885 recommendations and 81 6 percent have been followed We are encouraged by the progress that we have seen in the acceptance rate of our recommendations Blakey said However the board will continue to push federal and state government agencies industry and private companies for more safety improvements to enhance our transportation system for the benefit of all Americans The board s other most wanted safety improvements for 2002 include Preventing airplanes vehicles or people from entering airport runways by mistake We re afraid the next major accident will be on the ground not in the air in aviation Blakey said Allowing police officers to stop and write tickets that would impose both fines and points against a driver s license to motorists who are not wearing seat belts In 32 states police cannot ticket a motorist for not wearing a seat belt unless the driver has been pulled over

    Original URL path: http://twa800.com/news/ap-5-15-02.htm (2016-02-13)
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    principle of balance applies to an aircraft The aircraft s center of gravity CG is slightly ahead of the wing s center of lift CL and a downward balancing force is generated by the tail of the aircraft This balance principle applies to all aircraft from a toy balsa wood glider to the supersonic Concorde Now we all know what happens to a teeter totter if the heavy rider jumps to the opposite side of the board The board pitches up and both riders slam to the ground That is what happened to TWA800 When the nose was blown off the CG jumped to the other side of the CL TWA800 immediately pitched up stalled and fell out of the sky There is no way that TWA800 could have remained in a balanced attitude so that the wing could develop enough lift to climb 3 000 feet The zoom climb never happened Boeing provided the pertinent weight and balance information to the NTSB and the NTSB published it in the TWA800 accident report PLaintiff used this Boeing information to make the calculations shown on Exhibit A Then the Plaintiff presented the results to the NTSB and repeatedly asked the NTSB how it had calculated its zoom climb The NTSB refused to discuss the zoom climb claiming that it involved information proprietary to Boeing Concsequently Plaintiff submitted FOIA requests for the zoom climb information to both the CIA and the NTSB The CIA responded that We have researched this matter and have learned that the pertinent data and resulting conclusions were provided by the National Transportation Safety Board NTSB Exhibit B The NTSB responded that it couldn t release the information because it was based on data that was proprietary to Boeing Exhibit C But when the CIA cartoon was shown on national television Boeing issued a press release saying While we provided basic aerodynamic information to assist in the CIA s analysis of the airplane s performance we are not aware of the data that was used to develop the video Exhibit D All of the trails to the source of the zoom climb calculations lead back to the NTSB Normal accident investigation procedure required that the NTSB form a group to analyze the TWA800 flight path including the hypothetical zoom climb Since the zoom climb was one of NTSB conclusions all of the parties to the investigation such as ALPA and TWA and Boeing should have participated in that conclusion and the report of that group should have been a part of the public record However the NTSB did not form such a group Instead the NTSB seems to have assigned this task to only one individual within the NTSB This is what the Air Line Pilots Association ALPA had to say in its 43 pages of comments to the NTSB Exhibit E Furthermore although ALPA does not doubt the technical capability of the NTSB we are concerned that this analysis was essentially accomplished by only one individual at

    Original URL path: http://twa800.com/letters/lahr-4-2-02.htm (2016-02-13)
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